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**Think Like a Commander—Excellence in Leadership:
Educating Army Leaders with the Power Hungry Film**

Michelle L. Zbylut
U.S. Army Research Institute

Jason N. Ward
Kansas State University
Consortium Research Fellows Program

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Leader Development Research Unit

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

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**U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences**

A Directorate of the U.S. Army Human Resources Command

**ZITA M. SIMUTIS
Director**

Technical Review by

John S. Barnett, U.S. Army Research Institute
Joseph Psotka, U.S. Army Research Institute

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14. ABSTRACT (<i>Maximum 200 words</i>): This instructor's guide is the first of two research products that describe how to use Think Like a Commander Excellence in Leadership (TLAC-XL) in an instructional setting. This guide describes how instructors can use the film from TLAC-XL as a case study to facilitate discussion on various leadership topics, particularly those that pertain to creating effective interpersonal relationships. Instructors may find this training tool highly relevant for Captains, Lieutenants, and junior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) expected to engage in stability and support operations (SASO) in the Middle East. This guide provides an analysis and hard copy of the case study; discusses the teaching themes embedded in the case study; presents tips for promoting effective discussion; and offers lesson objectives, discussion questions and answers, and an overview of the case study as an instructional vehicle. Information about how to obtain the case study and technical requirements is included in the document.								
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Michelle L. Zbylut
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Jason N. Ward
Kansas State University
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Stanley M. Halpin, Chief

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22304-4841

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FOREWORD

With increasing United States activity in a variety of military operations other than war, non-commissioned officers and junior officers are often compelled to make decisions that can have far-reaching consequences for US activities abroad. Small-scale operations have the potential to become international incidents, and lower-level leaders must be able to think through the long-term implications of their actions. Additionally, prior to deployment leaders need to develop the interpersonal skills that will enable them to foster trust, communicate intent, share their vision, shape team climate, and instill confidence with their Soldiers because each of these elements is inextricably tied to mission success. As part of its Science and Technology Objective, the Leader Development Research Unit (LDRU) of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences has been working with the Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT) of the University of Southern California to combine the power of Hollywood storytelling with the technology of artificial intelligence to produce an educational package that enhances the interpersonal and social skills of Army leaders.

The result of the efforts of LDRU and ICT is a software package that combines a filmed case study, *Power Hungry*, with a computerized mentor who guides Soldiers through the lessons of the case study. Although evaluation is ongoing with respect to the entire software package, many requests have been made about whether the film can be used as a case study with a human instructor in lieu of the computerized mentor. The 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division Stryker Brigade Combat Team has been using the filmed case study in such a way in its Stryker Leaders Course.

This research product is intended to serve as an instructor's guide to assist instructors who wish to use the *Power Hungry* case study to facilitate discussion on a wide range of leadership topics. This paper provides an overview and analysis of the *Power Hungry* scenario, offers guidelines on how to promote group discussion, and presents discussion questions and answers to assist instructors in promoting a positive educational experience for their trainees.


STEPHEN L. GOLDBERG
Acting Technical Director

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Numerous individuals have contributed to the creation and advancement of the Think Like a Commander—Excellence in Leadership (TLAC-XL) development tool. First, the Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT) of the University of Southern California did a remarkable job in creating, filming, and editing the Power Hungry story. Although there are several individuals at ICT who worked on the TLAC-XL project, a few deserve special mention for their roles in the technological and storytelling aspects of TLAC-XL: Dr. Randall Hill, Dr. Andrew Gordon, Dr. Jay Douglas, Dr. Fred Pighin, Dr. Paul Debevec, Mr. Martin van Velsen, and Mr. Kim LeMasters.

Several military personnel also made significant contributions to the quality of TLAC-XL. Thanks is in order for several anonymous Captains from the United States Military Academy who provided stories and insights about their oversea deployments. Their stories served as the inspiration for the film script and the various teaching themes embedded in the film. Additionally, LTC (ret) Clark Delavan for the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) provided expertise and advice on location during the filming of TLAC-XL. The authors also would like to thank COL Robert Brown of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, for incorporating TLAC-XL into their Stryker Leaders Course and for allowing ARI personnel to observe how instructors conducted lessons using the Power Hungry film. Such observations of the outstanding instructors (particularly SFC Brian Mack, CPT John Sawyer, 1LT Samuel Levy, and SFC Rich Manning) at the Stryker Leaders Course served as a basis for some of the content and structure of this instructor's manual.

Multiple ARI personnel also have been involved with the TLAC-XL project. Dr. Stanley Halpin has played a significant role in promoting TLAC-XL and in guiding research, as has Mr. Robert Solick, the COR for this project. Mr. Rex Michel, now retired, was instrumental in the initial concept and development of TLAC-XL, while Dr. Larry Laffitte is part of the ongoing project team conducting research on the effectiveness of TLAC-XL. Dr. Joseph Psotka, one of the reviewers of this instructor's manual, provided the idea of including a training module called Leader Assessment. Finally, Mr. Trevor Conrad provided an early review of this instructor's manual, and his comments were greatly appreciated.

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**OVERVIEW OF
THINK LIKE A COMMANDER—EXCELLENCE IN LEADERSHIP**

OVERVIEW OF THE THINK LIKE A COMMANDER-- EXCELLENCE IN LEADERSHIP PROGRAM

Leaders must possess the interpersonal skills necessary to develop and sustain high-performance combined arms teams, as well as work with other services and nations during mission accomplishment. Complex, ambiguous operating environments demand leaders with fine-tuned conceptual skills for rapid information filtering, analysis and decision making. These teams may routinely deploy as part of a coalition to locations with immature transportation and logistic infrastructures and uncertain political situations—conditions requiring high levels of innovation and cultural awareness.

Colonel Jon H. Moilanen and Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Craig, US Army
Military Review, May-June 2000, pg. 13

As illustrated by the previous quote, Army transformation will result in greater decision-making and leadership responsibilities being placed on Soldiers in the field. The Army must prepare Soldiers for the full spectrum of situations that they will face in future operations. Indeed, current operations already place significant demands on the full range of leader skills. As Lieutenant General Brown (Ret) noted, "The Army is experiencing accelerated migration of leader tasks from higher to lower level echelon leaders. Cascading excellence requires greater leader competence at much lower leader echelons than previously needed" (2003, pg 69). With increasing US Army activity in a variety of stability and support operations and military operations other than war, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and junior officers are sometimes compelled to make decisions that can have far-reaching consequences for US activities abroad. Small-scale operations have the potential to become international incidents, and lower level leaders must be prepared to think through the long-term implications of their actions. Additionally, prior to deployment leaders need to develop the interpersonal skills that will enable them to foster trust, communicate intent, share their vision, shape team climate, and instill confidence in their Soldiers.

One method that can be used to help Soldiers develop their interpersonal, conceptual, and thinking skills is the case study method. Case studies are beneficial in that they can provide Soldiers with a surrogate for experience in a safe and risk-free environment.

In the past, case study exercises were often presented as written scenarios or computer graphic presentations. The scenario usually consisted of a series of facts or pieces of information, and the typical goal was to facilitate problem solving, critical thinking, and decision-making.

While many traditional case-based exercises are quite useful at helping Soldiers to develop critical thinking and problem solving skills, there are several disadvantages to the traditional methodology. One key disadvantage of the traditional scenario is that it fails to capture the many benefits of storytelling. Stories differ from traditional case studies by providing rich descriptions of setting, context, and characters. Such detail helps to engage a student cognitively and emotionally and allows for a better presentation of important leader and team issues such as communication, climate, relationships, cultural awareness, and managing the emotions of others. Furthermore, many stories are memorable either

because (a) elements of the story are similar to events that occur in an average person's life, or (b) elements of the story are so outrageous that they are remembered because they are unusual.

Because many traditional case studies do not utilize the full range of storytelling elements (e.g., plot, characters, dialogue, setting),

- Case studies often fail to engage the emotions of the student beyond the tactical level.
- Characters have few personality attributes.
- The thoughts, feelings, and motives of key characters are not depicted well.
- Case studies fail to provide convincing character dialogue and nonverbal communication.
- Case studies are often boring and abstract.

For the reasons listed above, many traditional case studies are inadequate for exploring the "human" aspects of leadership and teamwork. Thus, innovative ways of presenting case studies must be explored and refined to maximize learning outcomes. Incorporating story-telling elements (e.g., character dialogue, an antagonist, and a well-defined plot) into case studies can result in a richer, and therefore more effective, training tool. A complex and interesting story captures the attention of the audience, and when used as a case study, can challenge the intellectual capabilities of students to understand it and integrate it with their experiences. When told correctly, stories present students with the opportunity to identify with the main characters and allow the student to imagine what it would be like in that situation. This places students in a risk-free environment for experiencing events and developing tacit knowledge in real time; students can safely explore their assumptions and test potential avenues for behavior within the context of the scenario as the scenario unfolds. As students progress through the story, the unfolding events of the story provide feedback with respect to how correct their assumptions and choices of behavior were.

In conjunction with the Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT) and the Center for Army Leadership (CAL), ARI has combined the lessons learned from previous case-based exercises with the power of Hollywood filmmaking and artificial intelligence. The resulting leader development tool is known as TLAC-XL (Think Like a Commander — Excellence in Leadership). The original concept of TLAC-XL contains two parts: a film called *Power Hungry* and a computer interactive portion that encourages Soldiers to think about key leadership issues. The situations portrayed in the film were designed to promote discussion central to several leadership themes that are explained in greater detail later in this manual.

In a TLAC-XL instructional setting, Soldiers watch a 13-minute film called *Power Hungry*. The film is about a Captain charged with providing security for a food-distribution operation in Afghanistan. During the film, the Captain quickly loses control of the situation, and the film provides a useful starting point for Soldiers to discuss what went wrong. This film was written, produced, directed, and acted by Hollywood professionals and achieves the production standards of films like *Black Hawk Down*. Additionally, the *Power Hungry* film was inspired by a compilation of diverse interviews from Captains on the faculty at the United States Military Academy, and so it achieves a gritty realism that students immediately recognize as ground truth.

After watching the film, a computer-generated mentor guides the Soldier through the lessons embedded in the film. The lessons are communicated in two ways. First, the mentor asks the Soldier questions about key aspects of the situation (e.g., mission, enemy, terrain) and prompts the Soldier to type a response into the computer. Second, the Soldier is able to ask each character questions about what happened in the film. Each character represents a different lesson (e.g., command influence, cultural awareness, clarity of mission), and the mentor questions the Soldier about the lesson at the end of each interaction with a character. The mentor and characters provide both spoken and written responses to the Soldier.

Originally, TLAC-XL was created as a research prototype for investigating the usefulness of interactive technologies for leadership development. However, many instructors have expressed a desire to use TLAC-XL as an instructional tool. Furthermore, many instructors want to use only the film portion of the training package because the film immediately generates discussion on a large number of topics. Accordingly, the content in this guide is intended to help instructors who wish to use only the film portion of TLAC-XL as a springboard for discussion. Another research product is forthcoming that discusses how to use the entire TLAC-XL computer package for developing Army leaders.

This document provides four sections of guidance:

1. Instructions on how to install the *Power Hungry* film.
2. A general analysis of the *Power Hungry* case study.
3. The teaching themes addressed in this guide.
4. Information on how to conduct a discussion section.

The Appendices present supplemental material that instructors might find useful. Appendix A contains potential discussion questions to assist instructors in conducting discussion. Appendix B provides a general overview of the case study method as a viable educational alternative to lectures and introduces the concept of facilitated discussion through Socratic dialogue. Appendix C contains a written version of the *Power Hungry* scenario. The written version of the case study could be useful as an aid to recall elements of the *Power Hungry* film during instructor preparation or instruction. Additionally, parts of the written version are annotated to point out specific elements of the story. Lastly, Appendix D discusses information about the food distribution operation that is not presented in the *Power Hungry* film. Because the case study is part of a larger interactive software package, certain pieces of information are available to the student only in the computer interactive portion of TLAC-XL. Thus, Appendix D provides this information so that instructors can "leak" this information to students during the course of discussion.

QUICK TIPS FOR GETTING THROUGH THIS MANUAL

For quicker reading, instructors may want to concentrate on the following sections:

- ➔ *General Analysis of the Power Hungry Story*
- ➔ *Appendix A: Questions for Discussion*
- ➔ *Appendix D: Information Revealed During the Computer Interactive Portion*

Also, the key points of each section can be found in text boxes such as this one.

INSTALLING *POWER HUNGRY*

INSTALLING *POWER HUNGRY*

If you have not seen the *Power Hungry* film, yet, you should install it to your computer at this time.

Obtaining the Film

To receive a copy of the film, please contact:

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
Leader Development Research Unit
851 McClellan Ave, Building 90
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1360
(913) 684-9753

Systems Requirements

In order to view the TLAC-XL film properly, your computer or laptop should meet the following requirements:

- ➔ Microsoft Windows 95/98/NT/XP/2000
- ➔ Sound card, speakers or headphones required for audio
- ➔ 275 MB available hard disk space (for full installation)
- ➔ 16 MB video card that can display a resolution of at least 1024 X 786
- ➔ Pentium II processor or equivalent
- ➔ 32 MB or more of RAM
- ➔ Windows Media Player or equivalent player capable of displaying .avi files. Windows Media Player can be obtained at <http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowsmedia/players.aspx>.
- ➔ DivX 5.0.3 codec or higher when using Windows Media Player. The DivX codec can be downloaded at the following website <http://www.divx.com/divx/>.

Installing the Film

You will most likely receive the film on a CD-ROM. By simply clicking on the clip titled "film.avi" on the CD-ROM provided, you can play the TLAC-XL film. However, it is recommended that the film be copied onto your hard drive for maximum performance. You can copy the film from the CD to the hard drive using a typical "copy and paste" procedure.

If you are unfamiliar with how to copy and paste files, complete the following steps:

- 1) Insert the TLAC-XL CD-ROM into the CD-ROM drive.
- 2) Click on the **"My Computer"** icon on your desktop and select the CD-ROM drive (should be entitled "TLAC-XL.>").
- 3) Once the contents of the TLAC-XL CD-ROM are displayed, click on the file **"Film"** or copy the file to the hard drive and then click on the file "Film." To copy the file onto the hard drive, simply right click on the file in the CD-ROM view and select the **"Copy"** command. Next, select a location on the hard drive (making sure there is sufficient space) and right click again, this time selecting the command **"Paste."** Note that copying the film file onto the hard drive may take some time depending on the speed of your computer system.

The default video player used by your personal computer should now be able to open and play the video. Windows Media Player is recommended, but other media players, such as RealPlayer can be used.

Problems That You Might Encounter

One problem that can occur while trying to play the film in Windows Media Player (or similar video software) is that you may be able to hear the soundtrack of the film, but will not be able to see the video feed. You also might receive a message that the program is searching for "codecs." If either of the above problems occurs, then you should download the DivX codec and install it onto your hard drive. The DivX codec can be downloaded at the following website: <http://www.divx.com/divx/>.

Also, while playing the film it is advisable that you disengage your screensaver or set the screensaver to operate only after a long period of inactivity (e.g., 20 minutes or more). Otherwise, the screensaver may interrupt the film, which is 13 minutes long. To increase the delay on your screensaver, click on **"START," "SETTINGS," "CONTROL PANEL,"** and then find and click on the icon labeled **"Display."** Clicking on the **"Display"** icon will bring up a pop-up window with several tabs across the top. Select the tab entitled **"Screen Saver"** and change the value in the **"Wait"** box to 20 minutes or more.

If you fast forward, pause, or rewind the film, there may be a lag between the visual and audio of the film when you restart it. Typically, the video and audio will catch up to each other after a few seconds.

Points of Contact

If you experience difficulty with the film or have additional questions about how to use *Power Hungry* as a case study, please contact any of the following individuals at ARI:

Michelle Zbylut Research Psychologist Michelle.Zbylut@leavenworth.army.mil	Robert Solick Team Leader Robert.Solick@leavenworth.army.mil
Larry Laffitte Research Psychologist Larry.Laffitte@leavenworth.army.mil	Stanley Halpin Chief Stanely.Halpin@leavenworth.army.mil

The address and phone number of the Leader Development Research Unit are provided below:

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
Leader Development Research Unit
851 McClellan Ave, Building 90
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1360
(913) 684-9753

GENERAL ANALYSIS OF THE *POWER HUNGRY* SCENARIO

GENERAL ANALYSIS OF THE *POWER HUNGRY* SCENARIO

The *Power Hungry* story is a case study about a food distribution operation in Afghanistan. In the story, CPT Young was flown into the distribution at the last minute to replace a captain who needed to have his appendix removed. CPT Young did not know the Soldiers he was working with, and was unfamiliar with their strengths and weaknesses. CPT Young only had a few hours to prepare the food distribution site before the arrival of an NGO convoy. Once he arrived at the site, CPT Young discovered that the site was completely unprepared for the NGO convoy. Additionally, the food distribution site was in a large bowl surrounded by ridges, and the terrain presented significant challenges with respect to making it defensible and secure. The choice of the site was more political than tactical—the site was supposed to represent neutral territory.



CPT Young was not prepared for the situation in which he found himself for several reasons. First, CPT Young only received a general briefing from his commander. Although he should have asked for more specific details about the mission prior to arriving at the site, CPT Young's commander made it clear to his subordinates that he did not want to spend his time answering subordinate questions. As a result, CPT Young only had a general idea of what his mission was—to secure a food distribution site for the arrival of an NGO convoy. CPT Young's lack of mission clarity made it difficult for him to communicate to his Soldiers what the mission was, and thus, his Soldiers also were unclear on the mission. Later in the scenario, CPT Young's lack of clarity about the mission would come into conflict with CSM Pullman's understanding of the mission, leading to further confusion and uncertainty.

Second, prior to arriving on the site, CPT Young had no familiarity with the Soldiers he would be leading. CPT Young also did not have time to get to know the Soldiers because the NGO convoy was due to arrive in a few hours. Because of CPT Young's limited knowledge about his Soldiers, he should have asked for information about their strengths and weaknesses. 1SG Jones would have been a good resource for information about the Soldiers.

Third, although CPT Young had participated in two food distribution operations, CPT Young was still relatively inexperienced with these operations.

Moreover, several situational factors were against CPT Young. CPT Young did not know warlords were in the area and was at a disadvantage in not knowing that Omar and Mohammed were working together to take over the food distribution operation. Additionally, CPT Young did not realize that the food trucks

would not only be arriving earlier than scheduled, but the non-government organization (NGO) convoy would be approaching from the wrong direction. Finally, the head of the local security force was friends with Omar, and CPT Young did not realize that local security would be absent when he needed them most.

It is debatable, under these conditions, whether CPT Young could have successfully secured the site before the NGO convoy arrived. Many of the controls required to secure the arrival of the NGO convoy would have needed to be in place before CPT Young was ever on the site. However, CPT Young serves as an excellent case for examining leadership under uncertainty and addressing the question of how leaders should act in stressful and uncertain circumstances.

Effective leadership is always important, but it is especially critical in ambiguous and tense situations when leadership is required to impose clarity on an otherwise murky situation. The severe time constraints and unfolding complexity of the situation required that CPT Young step forward and offer clear goals and direction to his subordinates. The complexity of the situation also required that CPT Young have a solid understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of his Soldiers so that he could ensure that the team was working as effectively and efficiently as possible. However, in these circumstances, CPT Young was not an effective leader, and his shortcomings were magnified in the food distribution operation.

CPT Young created a command climate in which he discouraged his subordinates from asking questions and seeking clarification. When subordinates asked him questions, he publicly rebuked them for not thinking for themselves. For example, when CPT Young yelled at 1LT Perez to "think outside the box" 1LT Perez learned that CPT Young did not want to answer his questions. Ironically, CPT Young believed that such treatment of his subordinates would help them to develop and think for themselves; he also believed that he was empowering the Soldiers under his command to make their own decisions. CPT Young also believed that, if his Soldiers made mistakes, he would have time to rectify their errors. This was a serious miscalculation on CPT Young's part because, in this situation, he did not have time to fix any mistakes that his subordinates might have made.

While CPT Young's mission was to secure the site for the NGO convoy, CSM Pullman was on site to document the activities and to establish positive relations with the locals. Both CSM Pullman and CPT Young's missions were part of a bigger picture, which was to win over the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Although CPT Young and CSM Pullman's objectives appear complementary on the face of things, it was critical that CPT Young focused on securing the food distribution site rather than on generating positive relations with the locals. That is, the food needed to be distributed to the Afghan villagers with American assistance. However, CSM Pullman's presence on the site shifted CPT Young's notion of the mission from one of securing the site to one of maintaining positive relations with the locals. Thus, because CPT Young was trying to accomplish both goals at one time, the site was not prepared for the NGO convoy and Americans were not able to deliver food to the Afghan people.

Although CPT Young seemed resistant to accept the advice of anyone, this actually was not the case. CSM Pullman's presence did influence CPT Young's judgment and behaviors. Case in point, Young allowed the Afghans to retain their weapons, he entertained conversation with Omar (which is exactly what Omar wanted), and he had only one squad sent up to deal with the Afghans instead of two after Pullman mentioned that CPT Young should not escalate the confrontation. In CSM Pullman's eyes, Omar should have been viewed as another local, and thus, Omar needed to be treated civilly. However, Omar posed a threat to the security of the site and the operation. In many instances, CSM Pullman offered CPT Young sound advice and CPT Young was fortunate to have the knowledge of CSM Pullman available to him. However, CPT Young did more than use the advice provided to him by CSM Pullman; he began to adopt CSM Pullman's concept of the mission as his own. Consequently, CPT Young spent

considerably more time dealing with Omar than with providing essential guidance to his subordinates and securing the site. CPT Young also allowed both Omar and Mohammed and their men to remain on the site, and thus, the warlords were in place when the NGO convoy arrived.



Omar had several advantages over CPT Young. First, Omar knew the correct timing and route of the NGO convoy through relatives that he had in a neighboring village. CPT Young, however, had incorrect information about both the timing and the route of the convoy. Second, Omar and the leader of the local security force fought jihad together. Thus, local security was no help to the Army when both villagers and Omar's tribe mobbed the NGO convoy. Third, Omar staged a fight with Mohammed to trick CPT Young into believing that Omar and Mohammed were rival warlords. However, Omar and Mohammed were actually brothers-in-law, and their intent was to assume complete control of the food trucks. Omar also relied on the antagonistic personality of CPT Young to engage CPT Young in a battle of wills, which distracted CPT Young from delving into the family relationships of Omar.

When the NGO trucks arrived earlier than scheduled (and from the wrong direction), CPT Young was unprepared. The site was not secure because substantial effort had been diverted toward keeping the "rival" tribes apart. 1LT Perez and 1SG Jones were not at the food distribution site because they had gone into the foothills to establish contact with the NGO convoy. CPT Young was not even aware that his XO and 1SG had left the site. Local security abandoned the site when Omar and Mohammed arrived at the scene. Villagers had free access to mob the NGO convoy, and Omar's men were in place to ambush the trucks.

The *Power Hungry* story ends with Mohammed shooting a villager who is climbing onto a food truck and CPT Young wondering what to do next. However, the overall goal of the *Power Hungry* story is not to discuss how CPT Young can rectify the situation and regain control over the operation. Additionally, unlike a traditional training video, the story itself does not carry a clear message about what should be learned. That is, there is no one moral to the *Power Hungry* story. Instead, the story should be used to begin a dialogue process in which students discuss why events unfolded the way they did, with an emphasis on how CPT Young could have been a more effective leader and how the other Soldiers could have been more effective team members. At the end of the discussion, students should have formulated a better understanding about effective versus ineffective leadership under conditions of uncertainty, as well as develop an understanding of how various leader behaviors impact the behaviors of their subordinates.

TEACHING THEMES EMBEDDED IN *POWER HUNGRY*

TEACHING THEMES EMBEDDED IN *POWER HUNGRY*

Power Hungry can be used to talk about a variety of topics relevant to leadership and teamwork. However, this guide focuses on nine main themes:

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. <i>Command Climate</i> | 4. <i>Cultural Awareness</i> | 7. <i>Model of Command</i> |
| 2. <i>Command Influence</i> | 5. <i>Guiding Subordinates</i> | 8. <i>Respect for Experience</i> |
| 3. <i>Communication</i> | 6. <i>Mission Clarity</i> | 9. <i>Leadership Assessment</i> |

Additionally, students often express curiosity about two aspects of the film. First, during one point in the film, 1LT Perez and 1SG Jones left the site in order to establish communications with the NGO convoy. Students want to know why the 1LT and 1SG both needed to leave the site. Second, students want to know why the NGO convoy was allowed to enter the site before it was secure. Consequently, these topics also were included to help instructors facilitate discussion on these topics.

Each of the teaching themes and the goals of discussion are briefly discussed in this section. It should be noted that many of these themes are interrelated with one another. For example, communication influences the command climate and the command climate influences patterns of communication among team members.

1. COMMAND CLIMATE

FM 22-100 notes that leaders are responsible for shaping and maintaining the climates of their units. In the *Power Hungry* scenario, CPT Young created a command climate that discouraged subordinates from seeking clarification and guidance. This led to a failure in communication among many team members, and as a result, the mission suffered.

Questions to facilitate discussion about command climate begin on page A-2.

At the end of the discussion on command climate, students should:

- ➔ Understand the factors that contribute to command climate and be able to trace the origins of command climate.
- ➔ Understand that CPT Young conveyed to his subordinates that he did not want input from them.
- ➔ Understand that the command climate discouraged 2LT Wychowski from asking questions.
- ➔ Understand why 2LT Wychowski tried to implement a plan that he knew was bad.
- ➔ Understand how the command climate discouraged 1LT Perez from communicating his location and plans to move to higher ground.

2. COMMAND INFLUENCE

The US Army defines leadership as an influence process (FM 22-100), and typically a strong source of influence comes from the formal leadership position that one holds. In the *Power Hungry* scenario, CPT Young was the formally-designated authority figure at the food distribution site and was bound by the obligations and responsibilities inherent in that leadership position. However, CSM Pullman played a subtle, but significant, role in influencing CPT Young's judgment and decision-making.

Questions to facilitate discussion about command influence begin on page A-10.

At the end of the discussion on command influence, students should:

- ➔ Understand CSM Pullman's sources of influence and power.
- ➔ Understand what factors led Captain Young to lose focus on his mission.
- ➔ Understand why CPT Young did not have a solid understanding of the situation and mission he was undertaking.
- ➔ Understand how CSM Pullman influenced CPT Young's decision not to abort the mission.
- ➔ Understand that CPT Young could have delegated the task of interviewing Omar to CSM Pullman in order to free time for pursuing his main mission.

3. COMMUNICATION

Effective communication is an essential component of successful leadership. Effective communication requires that the leader is able to successfully transmit information, as well as comprehend what his or her subordinates are saying (or not saying). When discussing communication, it is important to keep in mind that communication is more than just the verbal content of a message. Nonverbal elements of communication such as tone of voice and facial expressions can convey information such as the sender's attitude toward the receiver and the importance of the message. Furthermore, behaviors also contain information, and a leader's behaviors can signal leader values and intentions.

It is the leader's responsibility to ensure that subordinates understand the commander's intent and vision. CPT Young did a poor job of communicating the mission and intent to his Soldiers and dismissed his subordinates' requests for clarification and guidance. His tone of voice and statements indicated that he did not want to be bothered by questions from his subordinates, and his behaviors indicated that dealing with the warlords took precedence over securing the site.

Questions to facilitate discussion about communication begin on page A-15.

At the end of the discussion on communication, students should:

- Understand why CPT Young did not communicate his intent effectively.
- Recognize that CPT Young did not clearly state his intentions through his words.
- Know that CPT Young should have recognized that 1LT Perez was not asking enough questions to do his job effectively.
- Understand that the command climate discouraged 2LT Wychowski from asking questions.
- Understand how the command climate discouraged 1LT Perez from communicating his location and plans to move to higher ground.

4. CULTURAL AWARENESS

FM 22-100 indicates that cultural awareness refers to a Soldier's comprehension of a group's beliefs values, and assumptions about what is important. When conducting stability and support operations overseas, cultural awareness may be particularly important because Soldiers may be required to interact with members of the local population. Knowledge about the local culture can help Army personnel facilitate positive relations with the locals, avoid international incidents, and anticipate enemy activity.

Often, the focus is on ensuring that US Army personnel understand the culture of the country to which they are going. However, there is substantially less focus on how the enemy might use cultural awareness about America against American Soldiers. In the Middle East, for example, the enemy might have significant understanding of American values, ways of thinking, and ways of reacting in various situations. Some of the enemy may have lived in the United States at some point in time or even attended an American university. It is important to recognize that such enemies understand how we might think and can use that knowledge to leverage an advantage against us.

CPT Young failed to understand the local Afghan culture and greatly underestimated Omar the Warlord's motivations and capabilities. While he was surprised to discover that Omar spoke English, CPT Young did not interpret Omar's language skills as a sign of sophistication and knowledge of American customs. While CPT Young had little cultural awareness about Afghanistan, Omar was well aware of American culture. Omar used his knowledge of American customs and ways of thinking to his advantage and was thus able to undermine the food operation.

Questions to facilitate discussion about cultural awareness begin on page A-20.

At the end of the discussion on cultural awareness, students should:

- ➔ Understand Omar's motive for obtaining the food.
- ➔ Identify the factors that allowed Omar to execute his plan successfully.
- ➔ Understand how Omar's cultural awareness about America contributed to his success.
- ➔ Understand how Omar knew the direction of the food trucks before CPT Young.
- ➔ Understand how the relationships between the warlord and the locals affected the unfolding of events.
- ➔ Recognize that CPT Young did not understand Omar's mission.
- ➔ Understand how CPT Young's assumptions about Omar influenced the way in which he handled Omar.
- ➔ Understand how Omar could have been prevented from executing his plan.
- ➔ Understand how lack of cultural awareness placed the Army at a disadvantage.

5. GUIDING SUBORDINATES

While Soldiers must be prepared to act in the absence of clear instructions and guidance, leaders must ensure that their subordinates understand the mission and intent, as well as have an appropriate plan of action for achieving the mission. CPT Young's Soldiers did not have a clear understanding of the mission or how to go about securing the site. When 1LT Perez asked CPT Young for guidance on to secure the site, CPT Young belittled 1LT Perez in public for expressing ignorance. While CPT Young might have believed that he was helping 1LT Perez to take the initiative, CPT Young's lack of guidance instead left Soldiers with an unclear understanding of the mission, which in turn presented a significant obstacle to Soldiers who were trying to develop and execute a plan to accomplish the mission.

Questions to facilitate discussion about giving guidance to subordinates begin on page A-28.

At the end of the discussion on giving guidance, students should:

- ➔ Understand why CPT Young does not provide guidance to his subordinates.
- ➔ Recognize that CPT Young's lack of guidance contributed to mission failure.

6. MISSION CLARITY

Leaders must possess a clear understanding of the mission and higher commander's intent in order to accomplish the mission. If the leader does not have a clear understanding of the mission and intent, the leader will not be able to develop and execute plans that will accomplish the objectives of the operation. Additionally, leaders who are unclear on the mission cannot communicate the nature of the mission to their subordinates and are more susceptible to outside influences impacting their understanding of the mission. In the *Power Hungry* situation, CPT Young's lack of mission clarity resulted in his subordinates having an unclear understanding of the mission. Furthermore, CPT Young's lack of mission clarity made him more susceptible to influence by CSM Pullman, who had complimentary, but different, objectives.

Questions to facilitate discussion about mission clarity begin on page A-31.

At the end of the discussion on mission clarity, students should:

- Understand why CPT Young did not have a solid understanding of the situation and mission he was undertaking.
- Understand what factors led CPT Young to lose focus on his mission.
- Recognize what 1LT Perez thought his role in the mission was.
- Understand how 1LT Perez's lack of understanding of the mission contributed to mission failure.
- Recognize that 2LT Wychowski did not have a clear understanding of the mission because CPT Young did not convey it.
- Recognize that 2LT Wychowski's conception of his role in the mission was in error.
- Recognize that 1SG Jones' understanding of the mission changed throughout.

7. MODEL OF COMMAND

Leaders explicitly and implicitly guide behavior in the unit. Explicitly, the leader specifies and clarifies goals, prioritizes resources, and directs and develops subordinates. The leader transmits those goals and plans through a statement, more or less complete, or his command intent. Implicitly, the leader's behavior serves as a vehicle for communication and sets an example of how others should behave. Thus, the leader sets the tone for the unit, both through spoken and unspoken channels of communication. Soldiers learn how to be leaders from their leader, as well as how to treat other Soldiers within the unit. Good leaders establish a model of command that develops junior and non-commissioned officers to be leaders in the future. CPT Young set a poor model of command for his Soldiers, and this model of command impacted the way in which his Soldiers treated each other. For example, 1LT Perez mimicked CPT Young's behavior when he berated 2LT Wychowski for asking him a question.

Questions to facilitate discussion about model of command begin on page A-37.

At the end of the discussion on model of command, students should:

- Recognize that CPT Young's approach to developing his subordinates was ineffective.
- Recognize that the model of command comes from the top and has a downward influence.
- Recognize that 1LT Perez consciously passed down CPT Young's model of command.

8. RESPECT FOR EXPERIENCE

Effective leaders realize that people are one of the most important assets to a unit. Thus, the leader must identify the strengths and weaknesses of his or her subordinates. Effective leaders utilize the strengths and experience of team members to the benefit of the unit and mission. Further, effective leaders invest time, effort, and energy in developing subordinates to overcome their deficiencies. Ultimately, the leader motivates both experienced and inexperienced subordinates to display leadership on their own when the leader is not there.

Because CPT Young arrived at the food distribution site with very little time to secure the site, it was critical that CPT Young assess the strengths and weaknesses of his Soldiers quickly. Because of his experience with the team, 1SG Jones would have been a valuable source of information about the Soldiers. CPT Young's failure to capitalize on the knowledge of 1SG Jones led to a poorly developed and executed plan on the part of 1LT Perez and 2LT Wychowski. CPT Young was not the only member of the team who failed to capitalize on the experience and knowledge of others. When seeking guidance, clarification, and advice, 2LT Wychowski could have gone to his NCOs for input.

Questions to facilitate discussion about respect for experience begin on page A-41.

At the end of the discussion on respect for experience, students should:

- Understand that 1SG Jones was an important asset underutilized by CPT Young.
- Understand 1LT Perez's qualities.
- Understand 2LT Wychowski's qualities.
- Understand that CPT Young's failure to capitalize on 1SG Jones' knowledge contributed to mission failure.
- Understand that 2LT Wychowski could have gone to his platoon sergeant and 1SG Jones for input since CPT Young and 1LT Perez provided no guidance.

9. LEADERSHIP ASSESSMENT

Effective leaders should be able to diagnose the strengths and weaknesses of themselves and of other leaders. FM 22-100 defines four major categories of leader character: Values, Attributes, Skills, and Actions. These major categories are broken into more specific dimensions. For example, the category of values includes several smaller dimensions, such as integrity and personal courage.

At the end of the lesson, students should be able to provide a summary of CPT Young's leadership with respect to his moral compass (values); his mental, physical, and emotional attributes; his interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills; and his influencing, operating, and improving actions. By actively encouraging students to compare their assessments with one another, students will formulate a better understanding of how to observe and practice assessment of all kinds: peer, subordinate, superior and self-assessment. Proper assessment of leadership is an essential step in promoting both subordinate and self-development and the case study provides an opportunity to hone those skills.

This theme can be used as a way to summarize the other themes that the instructor chooses to cover, as well as provide an opportunity to reinforce Army doctrine. An alternative to conducting this topic during discussion is to have students write a narrative assessment of CPT Young's leadership according to the leadership dimensions described in FM 22-100 (or the questions provided in Appendix A). Students can then compare their assessments of CPT Young at a later date in order to revisit the case study or lead into other discussions of leadership.

Questions to facilitate discussion about leadership assessment begin on page A-45.

At the end of the discussion on leadership assessment, students should:

- ➔ Know Army leadership doctrine as outlined in FM 22-100.
- ➔ Apply Army leadership doctrine to the assessment of demonstrated leader values.
- ➔ Apply Army leadership doctrine to the assessment of demonstrated leader attributes.
- ➔ Apply Army leadership doctrine to the assessment of demonstrated leader skills.
- ➔ Apply Army leadership doctrine to the assessment of demonstrated leader actions.

10. ADDITIONAL TOPICS

Stopping the NGO Convoy

Although not truly a leadership theme, preventing the arrival of the NGO convoy until the site was secure was essential for accomplishing the mission. Thus, many Soldiers recognize this point and may want to discuss this topic.

When discussing this topic, it is important to keep in mind that CPT Young had several challenges to preventing the convoy from entering the site. First, CPT Young was assigned to the site well after security preparations were underway, and it might have been too late for CPT Young to establish checkpoints to stall the NGO convoy in the event of an emergency. Second, CPT Young had incorrect

information about the timing and direction of the NGO convoy. Third, the US Army had difficulty establishing contact with the NGO convoy due to the poor quality of the radios. Communication with the NGO convoy was not established prior to Army arrival at the site because the Soldiers did not know which NGO convoy would be delivering the food until after the Soldiers arrived at the site.

It is uncertain whether CPT Young would have been able to stop the NGO convoy given the many situational factors working against him. However, Soldiers need to be prepared for situations in which information is incomplete or inaccurate and think through the strategic implications of what will happen if they act on incorrect assumptions. Soldiers also need to be prepared to coordinate with NGOs and local groups who may not be as organized as the US Army or have the communication technology that is available to the US Army.

Questions to facilitate discussion about stopping the NGO convoy begin on page A-51.

At the end of the discussion on stopping the NGO convoy, students should understand how CPT Young's assumptions about the NGO trucks contributed to mission failure.

Leaving the Site

In the *Power Hungry* scenario 1LT Perez, who is the XO, and 1SG Jones leave the food distribution site to establish radio contact with the NGO convoy. Since CPT Young is preoccupied with Omar the Warlord, this leaves one to wonder who is ensuring that the plan to secure the site is being executed correctly. While one approach to discussing this topic is to talk about why this was a bad decision on 1SG Jones and 1LT Perez's part, another approach is to talk about why 1SG Jones and 1LT Perez chose that course of action.

Questions to facilitate discussion about leaving the site begin on page A-53.

At the end of the discussion on leaving the site, students should understand the factors that led 1SG Jones to go along with 1LT Perez's decision to leave the site to establish radio contact.

Summary

It is unlikely that instructors will be able to conduct discussions on the eight major themes and two minor topics in a single instructional session. Thus, instructors should focus on a few topics of interest and discuss those topics in depth. The paper version of the *Power Hungry* can be used to refresh student's memories if the instructor would like to continue discussion at a later date.

It also is acknowledged that the *Power Hungry* scenario is sufficiently complex enough for instructors to find discussion topics in addition to the themes presented in this guide. Instructors should feel free to use the *Power Hungry* case study to develop lessons not discussed in this guide.

The next section presents information on how to conduct discussion. For additional information about the case study as teaching method, the reader is directed to Appendix B. This Appendix also provides an introduction to the Socratic method as a means for facilitating discussion and student learning.

CONDUCTING GROUP DISCUSSION

CONDUCTING GROUP DISCUSSION

The *Power Hungry* scenario was designed to encompass a large number of potential discussion topics so that instructors could use the film multiple times for exploring different leadership issues. The discussion questions contained in this paper are grouped by various themes (e.g., mission clarity, cultural awareness), but many potential discussion topics have not been examined in great detail (e.g., tactics, logistics). Instead, the themes addressed in this guide explore the more “human” aspects of leadership and teamwork, such as the dynamic between supervisors and subordinates. Although many important topics, such as decision making and planning, have been excluded from this guide, instructors who wish to pursue such topics are encouraged to design their own lessons and borrow from the questions contained in this guide. Several discussion questions and topics are presented in Appendix A.

From a time management perspective, it is unlikely that an instructor will be able to cover all the questions and topics included in this guide. Thus, it is recommended that instructors review the discussion topics and questions to determine which material is relevant for their particular training session. Additionally, instructors should feel free to incorporate their own questions and expertise into the discussion.

Elements of the Questions for Discussion Section

Appendix A presents a set of questions to assist instructors in generating discussion on a wide variety of topics. Appendix A, *Questions for Discussion*, consists of several elements:

- Discussion Topics
- Lessons to Be Learned from Each Topic
- Potential Discussion Questions for Each Topic
- Discussion Content for Each Question
- Probing Questions for Each General Discussion Question
- Experiential Discussion Questions For Each Topic

The next several paragraphs describe how to use the elements and information presented in Appendix A.

Discussion Topic

The *Questions for Discussion* section is divided into specific discussion topics. These discussion topics are listed below:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. <i>Command Climate</i> | 7. <i>Model of Command</i> |
| 2. <i>Command Influence</i> | 8. <i>Respect for Experience</i> |
| 3. <i>Communication</i> | 9. <i>Leadership Assessment</i> |
| 4. <i>Cultural Awareness</i> | 10. <i>NGO Trucks</i> |
| 5. <i>Guiding Subordinates</i> | 11. <i>Leaving the Site</i> |
| 6. <i>Mission Clarity</i> | |

The Lesson

Within each discussion topic is a brief statement that describes the general lesson that should be learned in the discussion. Beneath this general statement, labeled *The Lesson*, is a set of more specific learning objectives that can be achieved through guided discussion.

Potential Questions

Within each discussion topic is one or more potential discussion questions. These questions are provided to help the instructor elicit the information necessary to convey the general lesson. It should be noted that some of the same discussion questions appear in different topic areas. Thus, if instructors wish to cover multiple discussion topics, they should review which questions they would like to use with an effort to minimize redundancy.

Discussion Content

For each potential question, there is a section labeled *Discussion Content* that provides information that should be brought out during the course of the discussion. While the discussion content could, in a sense, be construed as an answer to the discussion question, instructors also should keep in mind that there might be several alternative answers to any given discussion question. Instructors are asked to use their judgment and expertise in constructing their own answers to discussion questions, as well as using the discussion content provided.

Probes

In addition to providing discussion content for each potential question, many of the general discussion questions also have a set of subsidiary questions, or PROBES, to help elicit specific pieces of information in the *Discussion Content* section. Probing questions are used to help students focus on specific pieces of information in the *Discussion Content* section. Probes also can be used to help redirect the discussion if the discussion begins to get off-topic. Instructors should feel free to ignore probes or ask different questions in order to elicit the responses they would like to hear from their students.

Experiential Discussion

Lastly, some discussion questions are paired with a set of questions labeled as *Experiential Discussion* questions. Experiential discussion questions are intended to help make the discussion more concrete and relevant by asking students to (a) place themselves in the position of one of the film characters, (b) recount past experiences that are relevant to the topic area, or (c) project how they would handle such a situation. Such questions will encourage students to examine what factors can impact their judgment and behavior and also facilitate sharing of experience among individuals with diverse backgrounds. Such questions also allow students to think through various elements of an experience without having actually had the experience.

Tips for Facilitating Discussion

Experienced instructors are likely familiar with much of the information presented in this section. Thus, these tips are intended primarily for instructors who have little experience conducting group discussions in a classroom setting. However, some of this information may be of use to more experienced instructors, as well.

Prior to beginning the instructional session, the instructor should be familiar with the film, instructor's guide, discussion questions, and discussion content. Optimally, the instructor will have selected which questions he or she would like to ask before beginning the session.

If the instructor is not familiar with the students or the students are not familiar with each other, the instructor may ask everyone to introduce themselves at the beginning of the instructional session. Introductions may or may not be feasible depending on the size of the discussion group. The instructor also should provide the students with an overview of what will happen during the session and what the purpose of the session is.

When entering the discussion phase of the session, the instructor should establish that students conduct themselves accordingly. Specifically,

- One person speaks at a time,
- Everyone participates,
- Confidentiality is expected, and
- Students should treat each other with respect and consideration.

These rules become more important as the group size gets larger and the instructor faces greater challenges in managing the dynamics of the group.

The Instructor's Role as Facilitator

The instructor's primary role as facilitator is to ask questions and guide the discussion when necessary. As a general rule, the students should do most of the talking. Because many of the discussion questions do not have a single correct answer, the goal is for students to pursue multiple avenues of thought in order to broaden their thinking about different leadership topics. Rather than providing students with an answer to a given question, the instructor should guide the discussion toward certain discussion points through the use of follow-up questions and probes.

Students, rather than the instructor, should do most of the talking during the course of the discussion.

There will be a tendency to get into tactics and doctrine as displayed in the film. The instructor should keep in mind that the intent of the lesson is not to talk about the logistical and tactical problems inherent in the food distribution operation; it is to talk about what could or should be done if ever faced with significant leadership challenges.

As the facilitator, the instructor sets the tone for the discussion. The instructor should communicate that each student's contribution to the discussion is important. The instructor should act respectfully toward students and avoid making derogatory comments. The instructor also should discourage students from directing derogatory comments toward one another. It should be noted that one of the goals of discussion is to fully explore the opinions, beliefs, and ideas of students, and this may involve some debating and challenging of those ideas. However, challenging a student's ideas should occur in as constructive a manner as possible and name-calling or insults to the person's competency should be avoided.

Encouraging Participation from Everyone in the Group

Some students are more outspoken than others, and sometimes one person will attempt to dominate the discussion. Other times, there are individuals who have many things to contribute but do not like to speak in group settings. In the event that the instructor has uneven participation from group members, the instructor can try one or all of the strategies listed in the text box below.

Strategies for increasing participation from quiet students.

- ➔ Increase eye contact with silent students, and reduce eye contact with individuals who are dominating the discussion.
- ➔ Look for non-verbal communication that suggests that a student disagrees or agrees with the comments that are being made. If the student agrees with the comment, ask if he or she can add anything. If the student disagrees with the comment, ask what he or she thinks about that statement.
- ➔ Ask the quiet student, "What do you think?" or if he or she has anything to add. Alternatively, direct a follow-up question to the individual.
- ➔ If a student is not participating due to boredom, ask for his or her opinion.
- ➔ Begin to direct discussion questions toward specific individuals and ask for contributions from other group members only after the first student has finished answering.

What Should the Instructor Do when a Student Is Wrong?

If a student makes a statement that is completely incorrect, other members of the group often will try to resolve the discrepancy without the instructor's intervention. However, the instructor might need to make sure that the discussion does not evolve into a name-calling session. At times, the instructor might need to refocus the group's energy on finding a better answer rather than focusing on what is wrong with the answer that was previously given. If the instructor feels the need to intervene, he or she could try asking a follow-up question that will lead the group to a better conclusion.

If a student makes a statement that is completely incorrect, other members of the group often will try to resolve the discrepancy without the instructor's intervention.

Because the film contains a lot of information in a short time frame, sometimes individuals miss important pieces of the film. For example, some individuals do not realize that Mohammed and Omar are brothers-in-law. Consequently, these individuals do not understand that Omar and Mohammed are co-conspirators rather than rivals. Obviously, this misconception must be addressed because the relationship between the warlords has serious implications for the success of the food distribution operation.

When such a misconception becomes apparent, the instructor might try to steer the discussion by asking students, "What is the relationship between Omar and Mohammed?" Generally, at least one of the students will remember that Omar stated that he was the brother-in-law of Mohammed. If students still fail to understand that Omar and Mohammed are related, the instructor might be more specific: "What did Omar say when CPT Young asked why Mohammed's men were attacking the NGO convoy with Omar's men?"

Facts from the film that students sometimes overlook include:

- ➔ CPT Young was assigned to the food distribution situation at the last minute because the previous commander needed an emergency appendectomy. CPT Young does not know these Soldiers.
- ➔ CSM Pullman is on site to direct camera crews who will videotape the food distribution operation. He is not there to secure the site.
- ➔ The food on the NGO convoys is for the villagers, not the Army.
- ➔ Omar and Mohammed are not part of the local security team.
- ➔ Omar and Mohammed are not rivals, but brothers-in-law.
- ➔ CPT Young did not get shot, an Afghan villager did.
- ➔ CPT Young did not select the site. The site was selected because it was neutral territory in which no warlords were supposed to be present.

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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

COMMAND CLIMATE

The Lesson: CPT Young created a command climate in which subordinates did not feel comfortable asking questions and seeking guidance. As a result, subordinates took steps to avoid CPT Young. Additionally, subordinates did not have a clear sense of what they should be doing to secure the site.

Learning Objectives:

1. Understanding the factors that contribute to command climate and being able to trace the origins of command climate.
2. Understanding that CPT Young conveys to his subordinates that he does not want input from them.
3. Understanding that CPT Young's lack of mission clarity was partially due to the command climate established by his commander.
4. Understanding that the command climate discouraged 2LT Wychowski from asking questions.
5. Understanding why 2LT Wychowski went with a plan that he knew was bad.
6. Understanding how the command climate discouraged 1LT Perez from communicating his location and plans to move to higher ground.

Potential Questions Begin on Next Page:

1. What kind of command climate did CPT Young create?

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

CPT Young created a command climate in which he discouraged input from subordinates. Additionally, he discouraged subordinates from asking questions and seeking clarification.

2. What elements contributed to the command climate of leaders not providing guidance and subordinates not seeking clarification?

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

How did CPT Young impact the command climate?

The command climate of not providing guidance and not asking questions stems from several sources. CPT Young is the primary force driving the command climate. However, he is not the only source driving the command climate.

What about CPT Young's interpersonal style?

CPT Young has a poor interpersonal style that makes him seem unapproachable. CPT Young publicly berated subordinates for asking him questions, so subordinates did not go to him for guidance when they needed it. For example, CPT Young publicly rebuked 1LT Perez for asking him for guidance. Such a display contributes to the command climate in two ways. First, 1LT Perez discovers that the CPT will not answer his questions, and will also humiliate him in public. Second, everyone who was a witness to the event (e.g., 1SG Jones, CSM Pullman) learns that the CPT does not like to be questioned.

How did CPT Young treat 1LT Perez when Perez asked about securing the site?

How do you think the time pressure affected CPT Young's behavior?

CPT Young feels pressured, and the way that he deals with this is by leaving his Soldiers to their own devices. He puts other issues, such as dealing with warlords, as a higher priority than dealing with his subordinates. CPT Young's feeling is that his Soldiers should already know what to do, or at least be able to figure it out. Many of the Soldiers, such as 1SG Jones and 1LT Perez, pick up on CPT Young's behavior and do not bother him with their questions. Because CPT Young acted too busy to speak with subordinates, his subordinates did not want to approach him.

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PROBES

Who took CPT Young's lead in perpetuating the command climate?

How did other Soldiers perpetuate the command climate?

What role do you think that CPT Young's commander plays in the command climate?

How did the command climate impact 2LT Wychowski?

Do you remember Wychowski saying that he heard CPT Young say he wanted them "to rethink the fencing?" What if I told you that Wychowski had a sense that the plan he was implementing was not going to work? Why do you think he continued to implement a bad plan?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

Young perpetuated the climate by setting a poor model of leadership, which his subordinates replicated in their relationships with other team members. For instance, 1LT Perez mimics CPT Young when he tells 2LT Wychowski, "We're in a box here... Improvise."

It is important to note that CPT Young's Soldiers model his behavior. As previously noted, 1LT Perez models CPT Young's behavior of rebuking subordinates for asking questions. As a result, 2LT Wychowski stops asking for guidance. 1SG Jones does not question 1LT Perez when Perez asks him to leave the site with him.

It is important to note that CPT Young was not the originator of the command climate. A very subtle point embedded in the computer Question and Answer Session (Q&A), is that CPT Young learned this behavior from his own commander. CPT Young's commander conveys to CPT Young that he doesn't have time to answer specific questions. CPT Young models his commander's behavior in his own interactions with subordinates.

Other answers worth discussing might include that CPT Young's commander is not developing CPT Young properly or providing constructive feedback about CPT Young's leadership style.

2LT Wychowski picks up on Young and Perez's behavior and realizes that they will not provide him with guidance. As a result, 2LT Wychowski continues to attempt to secure the site using a plan that he knows won't work.

MORE ON NEXT PAGE

PROBES

What role did the other Soldiers play in shaping the command climate?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

1SG Jones also picks up that CPT Young is someone who can't be bothered with answering questions. 1SG Jones also sees how 1LT Perez mimics CPT Young's leadership style. 1SG Jones becomes less proactive in providing his advice and in asking questions.

1LT Perez replicated CPT Young's dysfunctional behavior, and 1SG Jones and 2LT Wychowski perpetuated the climate by ceasing to ask questions and going along with activities that they knew could be detrimental to the mission.

In sum, CPT Young is primarily responsible for shaping the command climate at the food distribution site. However, it is important to recognize that CPT Young learned this behavior from his commander, and CPT Young passed this behavior down to his 1LT.

Experiential Discussion:

[For Captains and Lieutenants] What actions have you taken in the past to shape the climate of your group? How do you know if those behaviors were effective or not?

[For NCOs] How do you perpetuate the climate in your group? What, if anything, could 1SG Jones have done to improve the climate?

How would you have reacted to CPT Young if you were his subordinate? How do you think that CPT Young would have reacted to you?

Have you ever served under a leader who had a lack of people skills? How did it impact you? How did it impact the team?

3. *CPT Young did not have a clear understanding of the mission and the commander's intent. Why do you think that was?*

PROBES

What kind of briefing do you think that CPT Young received from his commander?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

According to CPT Young's Q&A session, CPT Young was only briefed in generalities. His commander did not provide specifics and promoted a climate of not asking questions. CPT Young should have asked for more information when he was first briefed, especially since he did not have a solid understanding of the situation. However, much like CPT Young, his commander appeared too busy to be bothered with questions from his Soldiers.

Consequently, CPT Young only had a general understanding that the mission was to provide security for a food distribution operation being handled by an NGO.

**Experiential
Discussion:**

What steps should you take to ensure that the people under you are adequately briefed? How will you know that they share your same vision of intent?

Have you ever received a briefing that was unclear? What did you do?

4. *Why do you think that 2LT Wychowski did not ask 1LT Perez what needed to be done in re-rigging the site?*

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

2LT Wychowski answered this question during his Q&A session. 2LT Wychowski picked up that 1LT Perez was modeling CPT Young's way of handling things. CPT Young did not want to be bothered with the details or asked questions, and Perez imitated Young's style of command. When Wychowski asked Perez a question, Perez rebuked him. Thus, Wychowski did not ask Perez questions. Additionally, 2LT Wychowski acknowledged that his plan for establishing the site was not a good plan. Wychowski went ahead with his plan because he knew that he would not receive guidance from 1LT Perez or CPT Young. While 2LT Wychowski should have been more aggressive in obtaining clarification, the command climate discouraged him from asking the questions he needed answers to.

**Experiential
Discussion:**

Have you ever felt uncomfortable asking a superior for clarification or guidance? Why? How did you get the information you needed to do your job?

Have you ever had to work with someone who was uncomfortable taking the initiative? How did people respond to that individual? How was team performance influenced?

What should 1LT Perez have done when Wychowski asked him for clarification and guidance?

5. *Later interviews with 2LT Wychowski indicated that he did not feel confident about his plan to rig the site. Why do you think that he continued to implement his plan if he did not think that the plan would work?*

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

According to 2LT Wychowski's Q&A session, Wychowski recognized that there didn't seem to be much planning going on at the food distribution site. Rather than coming up with a better plan or being more aggressive in obtaining guidance, Wychowski decided to follow the model of command that CPT Young had established. He also decided to set a low profile, consistent with the command climate that had been established. The interview with 1SG Jones seemed to indicate that Wychowski does not feel comfortable taking initiative in new situations; thus, the combination of the command climate and Wychowski's personality contributed to Wychowski's actions.

**Experiential
Discussion:**

What would you have done in Wychowski's shoes? How would your actions have changed things?

6. *Why didn't 1LT Perez keep CPT Young posted on his position when he left the site in the Humvee?*

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

Students should find it strange that 1LT Perez decided to take the 1SG with him to make contact with the NGO convoy. At least one of them should have remained at the site to ensure that the plan to secure the site was being executed properly. Students also should recognize that 1LT Perez should have informed CPT Young that both he and 1SG Jones were leaving the site.

According to Perez in his Q&A session, he didn't tell CPT Young that he was no longer at the site because CPT Young gave people the impression that he didn't want to deal with the details of the operation. Perez also believed that Young wanted people to take the initiative on their own without looking for Young's approval. While 1LT Perez's decision to leave the site with the 1SG and without notifying the Captain was a poor decision, it was a decision consistent with the command climate that CPT Young created. Additionally, 1LT Perez did not want to distract CPT Young from dealing with the warlords. Such behavior demonstrates that Perez did not have a clear understanding of what the mission was. That is, 1LT Perez should have recognized that securing the site and delaying the NGO trucks was critical to mission success, and that this should take priority over maintaining positive relations with the warlords.

COMMAND INFLUENCE

The Lesson: CSM Pullman influenced CPT Young's understanding of the mission.

Learning Objectives:

1. Understanding CSM Pullman's sources of influence and power.
2. Understanding what factors led CPT Young to lose focus on his mission.
3. Understanding why CPT Young did not have a solid understanding of the situation and mission he was undertaking.
4. Understanding how CSM Pullman influenced CPT Young's decision not to abort the mission.
5. Understand that CPT Young could have delegated the task of interviewing Omar to CSM Pullman in order to free time for pursuing his main mission.

Potential Discussion Questions Begin on Next Page:

1. What was CPT Young's original understanding of the mission? Why do you think his early understanding was unclear?

PROBES

Do you think that the briefing that CPT Young received was specific or general?

If I told you that CPT Young received only a general briefing from his commander, why do you think that CPT Young did not ask for clarification?

What role did CSM Pullman play in Young's understanding of the mission?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

According to CPT Young's Q&A session, Young was briefed only in generalities. His commander did not provide specifics and promoted a climate of not asking questions. Consequently, Young only had a general understanding that the mission was to provide security for a food distribution operation being handled by an NGO.

Furthermore, Young allowed Pullman to shape his understanding of the mission. Young's original mission was to secure the site for the NGO trucks, but he got pulled into the notion of maintaining positive relations with the local population. Young's shift toward "being partners with the locals" partially contributed to letting the warlords stay on the land.

Experiential Discussion:

If I told you that CPT Young was only briefed in generalities, how would that change your opinion of him?

If you had a commander who didn't like to be bothered with questions, what would you have done to ensure that you understood the mission? What would have been the result of your actions?

Have you ever been unclear on the specifics of your mission? What happened as a result?

2. Did CSM Pullman's presence cause CPT Young's concept of the mission to shift? Why or why not?

PROBES

What do you think was going through CPT Young's mind when he first arrived at the food distribution site?

How did the objectives of CPT Young and CSM Pullman differ? How were their goals complimentary? How were their goals contradictory?

Did CPT Young listen to the advice of CSM Pullman? What leads you to draw that conclusion?

Whose idea was it to allow the Afghan warriors to retain their weapons? Whose idea was it to have "tea" with Omar?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

Although it is easy to point to CPT Young and say that he was a bad leader, let's step back for a moment and look at the situation from CPT Young's perspective. It is important to recall that CPT Young was never clear on the mission to begin with because his commander did not like to answer questions or take the time to provide guidance to his subordinates. Additionally, CPT Young knew that he had minimal time to get the site prepared for the arrival of the NGO convoy. Thus, CPT Young arrived at the site with nothing more than a general notion of what the mission and intent were, with the knowledge that time was short. As a result, CPT Young hit the ground running and was looking for information that would suggest to him what he should be doing immediately.

CPT Young's fuzzy notion of the mission made him more susceptible to losing track of what his actual mission was. CSM Pullman's presence on site made CPT Young question the nature of the mission, and Young's notion of the mission began to shift. While Young maintains during his Q&A session that his primary mission was to set up a food distribution operation, his behavior conveys that his concept of the mission also began to encompass things like maintaining positive relations with the locals. CSM Pullman was on site to videotape the food distribution operation and to ensure positive relations with the locals. From Pullman's perspective, Omar was just another local who should be viewed as a potential partner. However, from the perspective of the security and setup of the food distribution operation, Omar should have been viewed as a threat. While both CPT Young and CSM Pullman's missions contribute to the larger picture of winning over the hearts and minds of the local population, their missions needed to be reconciled with respect to how to best deal with Omar. Having positive relations with the locals is contingent upon the success of a secure and uneventful food distribution operation. Thus, CSM Pullman's part of the mission can be successful **only** if CPT Young's part of the mission is successful.

Although Young seemed resistant to accept the advice of anyone, he did modify his behavior because of Pullman's presence. Case in point, Young followed Pullman's advice when he allowed the Afghans to retain their weapons, entertained conversation with Omar (which is exactly what Omar wanted), and had only one squad sent up to deal with the Afghans instead of two. CPT Young was greatly influenced by CSM Pullman's statement that Pullman's boss wanted "a win in a big way" and "to be partners with the locals."

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PROBES

What sources of influence or power did CSM Pullman have over CPT Young?

How do you think CSM Pullman's connections with Brigade impacted CPT Young's behavior?

Do you think CPT Young viewed CSM Pullman as a knowledgeable source on the food distribution situation?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

Many students do not recognize that CSM Pullman had several sources of influence over CPT Young. First, CSM Pullman had political connections in that he worked for the Brigade Commander. Thus, not only does Pullman have potential to get things done for CPT Young through his connections with Brigade, CSM Pullman can put a positive or negative word about CPT Young's performance into the ear of the Brigade Commander. CPT Young wants both himself and his commander to look good in the eyes of Brigade.

Second, Pullman sat in on the briefings, so Young believed that Pullman had a pretty good idea about what was going on at the food distribution site. Additionally, Young believed that Pullman's relationship with the Brigade commander gave him knowledge about what the Brigade commander wanted.

Third, CSM Pullman had information that the Captain needed, since the CSM had experience with similar sorts of operations and with the culture. When Omar and Mohamed arrived at the food distribution site, CPT Young was relying on Pullman's expert knowledge about the locals and their customs.

Experiential Discussion:

Have you ever witnessed an NCO influence a Captain's understanding of the mission? Was this a good thing or a bad thing?

What role did Army politics play in the interaction between CSM Pullman and CPT Young?

How could CSM Pullman have better helped CPT Young? How could CPT Young have better capitalized on CSM Pullman's experience and knowledge?

What would have happened if CPT Young had delegated the task of interviewing Omar to CSM Pullman?

3. *Why do you think CPT Young refrained from contacting headquarters about the possibility of calling off the operation?*

PROBES

Do you think CPT Young was worried about what Brigade would think of him?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

According to CPT Young's Q&A session, Young was concerned that CSM Pullman said his boss wanted "a win." Young was concerned with how he and his commander might be viewed, given that the Brigade commander wanted a successful mission. Young did not want Brigade to view him as incompetent. As a result, CPT Young did not call headquarters about the possibility of calling off the mission.

**Experiential
Discussion:**

How would the knowledge that the Brigade commander wanted the food distributed to the local villagers have impacted your decision to call off the operation?

What would have been the result of your decision? How would your decision have impacted your Soldiers? How would your decision have impacted the likelihood of success of future missions like this one?

COMMUNICATION

The Lesson: CPT Young and his Soldiers did not communicate effectively with one another. CPT Young did a particularly poor job at sharing his intent with his Soldiers.

Learning Objectives:

1. Understanding why CPT Young did not communicate his intent effectively.
2. Recognizing that CPT Young did not clearly state his intentions through his words.
3. Knowing that CPT Young should have recognized that 1LT Perez was not asking enough questions to do his job effectively.
4. Understanding that the command climate discouraged 2LT Wychowski from asking questions.
5. Understanding how the command climate discouraged 1LT Perez from communicating his location and plans to move to higher ground.

Potential Questions Begin on Next Page:

1. *What signs did CPT Young have that 1LT Perez did not completely understand what he was supposed to be doing?*

PROBES

How would you describe the amount of communication between CPT Young and 1LT Perez?

Do you think that 1LT Perez should have been asking more questions?

How did CPT Young react to questions from his XO?

What sorts of things should 1LT Perez have been communicating to the CPT throughout the film?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

CPT Young created a command climate that discouraged subordinates from asking questions and seeking guidance. However, CPT Young should have recognized that over time, he was not getting enough questions from his subordinates.

According to 1SG Jones in his Q&A session, CPT Young should have picked up on the fact that 1LT Perez was not asking enough questions of CPT Young. As 1SG Jones so aptly put it, "I go on and tell you to build a fence, and you say okay, I gotta wonder why you didn't ask me what kind of fence I wanted." CPT Young should have followed up with 1LT Perez to ensure that Perez knew what to do.

Another sign that CPT Young should have recognized was that 1LT Perez was not communicating to CPT Young his various activities. Specifically, Young was quite surprised to find out that Perez was no longer at the site, but had left the site to make contact with the NGO convoy.

The adage that "no news is good news" is not a good motto to apply in leadership. In CPT Young's case, "no news" was a result of the command climate that he created. From his subordinates' perspective, CPT Young did not want to be approached, and speaking to CPT Young was likely to be a very unrewarding and negative experience. While CPT Young followed the "no news is good news" mentality, it was more likely that his subordinates followed the philosophy that the Captain would "shoot the messenger." Thus, subordinates minimized communicating with the Captain at all costs.

*Have you ever had a superior "shoot you down" when you asked a question or offered a suggestion?
How did this affect your future interactions with this person?*

*Have you ever publicly belittled a team member or subordinate for asking a stupid or trivial question?
How did that impact your working relationship? [The instructor might rephrase to ask if students ever witnessed that happening to someone else.]*

Have you ever had a subordinate who does not communicate very well with you? Why do you think that is? What can you do to help that person develop a habit of communicating with you?

2. *Why do you think that 2LT Wychowski did not ask 1LT Perez what needed to be done in re-rigging the site?*

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

2LT Wychowski answered this question in his Q&A session. 2LT Wychowski recognized that 1LT Perez was modeling CPT Young's way of handling things. CPT Young did not want to be bothered with the details or asked questions, and 1LT Perez imitated CPT Young's style of command. When 2LT Wychowski asked 1LT Perez a question, 1LT Perez rebuked him. As a result, 2LT Wychowski did not ask 1LT Perez any further questions.

**Experiential
Discussion:**

What would you have done in 2LT Wychowski's shoes?

3. *Why do you think that 1LT Perez did not keep CPT Young posted on his position when he left the site in the Humvee?*

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

How did CPT Young's behavior encourage Perez's lack of communication?

According to 1LT Perez, he didn't tell CPT Young because CPT Young gave people the impression that he did not want to deal with details. 1LT Perez also believed that Young wanted people to take the initiative on their own without looking for Young's approval. Thus, the command climate supported 1LT Perez's decision not to communicate with CPT Young about his location or plans for contacting the NGO trucks.

How did 1LT Perez's understanding of the mission impact his communications with the Captain?

Additionally, 1LT Perez believed that it was more important that CPT Young keep his attention focused on the warlords, demonstrating that 1LT Perez did not have a clear understanding of what the mission was. 1LT Perez did not have a clear understanding of what the mission was because CPT Young did not go into sufficient detail about what the mission was.

4. Why was CPT Young ineffective at communicating the intent of the mission?

PROBES

Did CPT Young have a solid understanding of what his mission was?

From a subordinate's perspective, what was it like to deal with CPT Young?

What was CPT Young's mission?

If you were to analyze CPT Young's behaviors, what would you think the mission was?

Experiential Discussion:

DISCUSSION CONTENT

CPT Young was ineffective at communicating the intent of the mission for several reasons.

First, CPT Young only had a general idea of what the mission was, and thus could not be very specific himself about the nature of the mission. He never explicitly stated what the mission was, he merely said that the Soldiers were to turn the site into "the world's largest McDonald's."

Second, CPT Young's interpersonal style discouraged subordinates from seeking additional clarification and guidance. He did not answer questions with substantive answers. He told subordinates not to ask questions to which they did not have answers. He publicly rebuked subordinates and made subordinates feel like idiots for asking him questions. Thus, subordinates who were unclear about the mission did not feel comfortable asking CPT Young for clarification.

Third, it is important to recognize that CPT Young's behaviors were inconsistent with the mission. CPT Young's mission was to secure the site for the food distribution operation. However, CPT Young's behavior emphasized a different mission. That is, CPT Young conveyed that maintaining public relations with the locals was a more important priority by spending time with Omar and allowing Omar and his men to remain inside the perimeter. Many of Young's men, including 1LT Perez and 2LT Wychowski, came to believe that part of the mission was to maintain good public relations with the locals.

Have you ever misunderstood the intent of your superior? What made the leader ineffective? What happened as a result of the misunderstanding? What should the leader have done?

5. Provide some examples in which CPT Young did not clearly communicate what he was thinking.

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

CPT Young will never be called "The Great Communicator" because he never confirms that what he says is interpreted consistently with what he means.

Examples:

- When Young tells Perez to slow the trucks down, he means that Perez should stop the trucks. Perez took the Captain literally and thought that Young meant slow the trucks down. Of course, Perez did not have time to either slow down or to stop the trucks, so this might be a moot point with respect to the actual outcome of the mission.
- According to CPT Young's Q&A session, when Young ordered a squad with weapons "locked and loaded," he mainly wanted the Army to give a demonstration of power. He thought that his men would have the understanding that they could react with deadly force under the Rules of Engagement (ROE) if the Afghans fired upon the American Soldiers. However, according to 2LT Wychowski's Q&A session, Wychowski ordered his platoon to start shooting any Afghan pointing a weapon at them as soon as Mohammed shot the villager.
- When CPT Young tells his subordinates to "think outside the box," what he really means is to take the initiative. Young is giving his Soldiers the okay to make decisions for themselves. However, 1LT Perez does not understand what the phrase "think outside the box" means, and he acknowledges that fact in his Q&A session. Indeed, when 1LT Perez tries to use the phrase with 2LT Wychowski, he uses it incorrectly, telling Wychowski that, "We're in a box here. Invent. Improvise."
- CPT Young does not clearly convey the nature of the mission or his intent. He merely says that they are "responsible for the lives of 122 American Soldiers and they only have half the time they need to turn the site into the world's largest McDonald's."

What did CPT Young mean when he told Perez to "slow those trucks down?"

What do you think CPT Young meant when he told his Soldiers to have their weapons "locked and loaded?"

What do you think that CPT Young was trying to accomplish by telling 1LT Perez to "think outside the box?"

How did CPT Young convey the nature of the mission to his subordinates?

**Experiential
Discussion:**

If you were in CPT Young's position, what would you have done to better convey the mission and your intent with your team?

How would you have known that your subordinates shared your intent and understanding of the mission?

CULTURAL AWARENESS

The Lesson: CPT Young's lack of understanding of the Afghan culture gave Omar the advantage and made him susceptible to Omar's deception. Conversely, Omar's understanding of American culture helped Omar to succeed in his plan to seize the NGO convoy.

Learning Objectives:

1. Understanding Omar's motive for obtaining the food.
2. Identifying the factors that allowed Omar to execute his plan successfully.
3. Understanding how Omar's cultural awareness about America contributed to his success.
4. Understanding how Omar knew the direction of the food trucks before CPT Young.
5. Understanding how the relationships between the warlord and the locals affected the unfolding of events.
6. Recognizing that CPT Young did not understand Omar's mission.
7. Understanding how CPT Young's assumptions about Omar influenced the way in which he handled Omar.
8. Understanding what steps could have been taken to prevent Omar from executing his plan.
9. Understanding how lack of cultural awareness placed the Army at a disadvantage.

Potential Questions Begin on Next Page:

1. Why do you think that Omar wanted to seize control of the food distribution operation?

PROBES

How could Omar use the food to improve his power hold in the region?

How do you think Omar felt about having Americans distributing the food to the local population?

Experiential Discussion:

DISCUSSION CONTENT

Omar indicated a dual motivation in his Q&A session. First, Omar wanted to control the food as a source of power over the villagers. By controlling the food, which the villagers needed to survive, Omar would have control over the villagers.

Second, Omar did not want Americans to be the ones distributing the food. He believed that the village was under his protection, and he should be the one distributing the food, not the US. He did not want the US to have influence over Afghan sentiment.

What sorts of attitudes toward the American military have you encountered overseas? How did those attitudes impact you?

2. How did Omar's awareness of American culture help him execute his plan to seize the food?

PROBES

Omar knew that CPT Young would want to deal with a tribal leader. How did Omar use this piece of knowledge to his advantage?

What was Omar's master plan for the food distribution operation? What did Omar convince CPT Young that his intent was?

Why do you think Omar staged a fight with Mohammed? How did such deceit give Omar an advantage?

Experiential Discussion:

DISCUSSION CONTENT

Omar was very aware of how the US military would respond to him. His knowledge of American culture allowed Omar to establish a presence at the site before the food trucks arrived. First, Omar knew that CPT Young would want to deal with the tribal leader. This is important because it allowed Omar and his men to be positioned on the site and gave Young a false understanding of the situation. This also occupied Young's time so that he spent less time focusing on preparing the site and comparatively more time dealing with Omar.

Second, Omar allowed Young to believe that he could be controlled by offering help in the form of "protection." This misdirected Young's attention from Omar's true mission, which was to assume complete control of the food operation. Instead, Young believed that Omar was just out for a "bigger piece of the pie," not the whole pie. Young grossly underestimated Omar's agenda when he assumed that Omar was basically running a "protection racket."

Third, Omar knew that if he staged a fight between himself and Mohammed, the Americans would jump to the conclusion that they were competing factions. This is important because it diverted Young's attention away from securing the site. Young was instead preoccupied with keeping the "rival clans" apart. Additionally, this deception allowed both Omar and Mohammed's troops to be present at the site. If Young had known that the two were in cahoots, then it would be highly unlikely that so many hostiles would have been allowed to remain on site.

Would you have made the same assumption as CPT Young if you had witnessed Omar and Mohammed fighting?

How can you avoid making those assumptions, especially when you are under tight time constraints?

3. ***Omar used his relationships with key individuals in the Afghan population to help implement his plan. Describe the key relationships that Omar had and discuss how these relationships aided Omar in seizing the food. [Note to instructor: You may have to "leak" some of the key relationships to students since some of this information is revealed in the computer interactive segment of the TLAC-XL program.]***

PROBES

How did the relationship between Omar and Mohammed impact the mission?

Omar knew about the correct direction and timing of the NGO trucks because he had relatives in a neighboring village who knew that information. How does the way that Omar knows things differ from the traditional ways that the American military obtains intelligence?

Omar fights "jihad" with the leader of the local security hired by the Americans. How do you think Omar's relationship with local security impacted events?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

Relationships and loyalties are an important component of Afghan culture. Omar uses his relationships with various Afghan locals to implement his plan.

His relationship with Mohammed allowed Omar to have a greater presence on site because he technically had twice the number of men (i.e., both Mohammed's and Omar's men).

His knowledge of the true direction of the food trucks allowed Omar to be more prepared than the Americans for the arrival of the trucks. He got his knowledge from relationships he had with locals ("kin of kin"). Omar also knew the correct timing of the NGO trucks because of information that he had from relatives.

During his Q&A session, Omar indicated that he fights jihad with the leader of the local security team hired by the US. When Omar arrived at the site, local security disappeared. Omar's relationship with local security left the Army and food trucks with no local security and Americans with fewer men with which to defend the trucks.

**Experiential
Discussion:**

Were you surprised to find out the Omar had so many strategic relationships and that these relationships were unknown to the American military?

How important were relationships to Omar in implementing his plan? How does this differ from the way in which the American military implements its plans?

Has anyone had the experience of having incomplete intelligence? What did you do? What happened as a result?

If you were in charge of setting up a food distribution operation, what would you want to know about the local population?

4. When CPT Young initially met with Omar, what did CPT Young think that Omar wanted?

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

CPT Young did not understand that Omar's ultimate goal was to seize control over the entire food distribution operation. Basically, CPT Young believed that Omar was running a sort of protection racket and just wanted a cut of whatever it was that was being offered. As CPT Young stated in his Q&A session, "I thought he just wanted a bigger piece of the pie." CPT Young greatly underestimated Omar and his goals; he thought that Omar and Mohammed were in competition with one another in a struggle for power, and he likely thought that both Omar and Mohammed were motivated by less ambitious objectives, such as participation in the food distribution operation and getting more power or money than the other.

**Experiential
Discussion:**

When Omar first appeared on the scene, what was your impression of Omar?

If you were in CPT Young's shoes, how would you have dealt with Omar? What would Omar's reaction have been to you?

5. CPT Young greatly underestimated the sophistication of Omar and his men. As a result, Omar was able to achieve several advantages over CPT Young. What advantages did Omar gain through CPT Young's assumptions about him?

PROBES

What assumptions did CPT Young make about Omar?

Why were both Omar and Mohammed allowed to keep their men at the site?

Why do you think that local security disappeared? Do you think things would have been different if local security had remained on site?

How did spending time with Omar hinder CPT Young from successfully executing the mission?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

CPT Young assumed that Omar and Mohammed were rivals. He also assumed that Omar wanted a piece of the food distribution operation rather than complete control over the operation. CPT Young overlooked that Omar had ties to the locals hired for security. CPT Young also did not know that Omar had ties to locals who knew the correct timing and route of the convoy.

As a result of CPT Young's assumptions, Omar and Mohammed were allowed to keep their men on or near the site.

CPT Young was not prepared for the disappearance of local security because he did not know that Omar and the leader of local security had an ongoing relationship.

CPT Young entertained a conversation with Omar and allowed him to remain in camp (while listening to all of the communications coming over Young's radio). Additionally, Young wasted time dealing with Omar when that time could have been spent giving his Soldiers direction and guidance.

Ultimately, CPT Young did not have his Soldiers or local security in place to the prevent seizure of the trucks. Omar was much more prepared for the arrival of the food trucks than CPT Young, giving the Afghans an advantage over the US Soldiers.

6. *What would have happened if CPT Young had asked Omar to introduce him to the village elders?*

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

In the Q&A session, Omar indicates that CPT Young should have asked Omar to introduce him to the village elders. Omar would not have been able to comply with CPT Young's request, because the elders might have exposed the true relationship between Omar and Mohammed. Omar's lack of compliance would have made CPT Young suspicious, therefore taking the advantage of surprise away from Omar. It also may have been less likely that CPT Young would have allowed Omar and his men to remain at the site.

7. *How did the Army's lack of cultural awareness impact the way events unfolded at the food distribution site?*
[Summary question; many components were addressed by previous questions.]

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

The Army's knowledge of the local situation was limited in several ways. First, the Army did not appear to have any intelligence on hostiles in the area and were thus caught off guard when Omar and Mohammed arrived at the site. Second, members of the company did not recognize that relationships among Afghans are an important resource for the enemy. Omar's information (e.g., timing and route of NGO convoy) and strategy (having local security leave, having Mohammed on site) were almost completely based on relationships he had with other Afghans. Unearthing these relationships prior to the operation would have been key to securing the site and protecting the food trucks. CPT Young did not realize that it would be both appropriate and informative to ask Omar to see the village elders. Requesting to see the village elders was key because Omar knew that the village elders could expose his true relationship with Mohammed.

**Experiential
Discussion:**

What is the short-term impact of allowing and his men to seize control of the food trucks?

- *What is the impact on the Battalion?*
- *What is the impact on the Afghan villagers?*
- *What is the impact on the NGO?*

What is the long-term impact of allowing Omar to seize the trucks?

- *How would that impact future military operations in that area of Afghanistan?*
- *How will success in seizing the trucks impact Omar's power in the region?*
- *What are the long-term consequences for the Afghan villagers?*
- *What will be the impact on the Soldiers who were involved in the food distribution operation?*

What would happen if CPT Young and his Soldiers decided to regain control over the food trucks?

- *To Omar and his men?*
- *To the Afghan villagers?*
- *To the NGO drivers and organization as a whole?*
- *To the troops involved?*

GUIDING SUBORDINATES

The Lesson: CPT Young failed to give his subordinates much needed guidance. Moreover, 1LT Perez modeled CPT Young and did not give guidance to his subordinates.

Learning Objectives:

1. Understanding why CPT Young does not provide guidance to his subordinates.
2. Recognizing that CPT Young's lack of guidance contributed to mission failure.

Potential Questions Begin on Next Page:

1. Why didn't CPT Young provide more guidance to his subordinates?

PROBES

Why do you think CPT Young placed dealing with Omar as a higher priority than giving guidance to his subordinates?

How do you think CPT Young's commander would have handled the situation?

CPT Young thought that he was helping to develop his subordinates by giving them free reign to figure things out. If you were in CPT Young's shoes, how would you have dealt with your subordinates?

CPT Young thought that he would have time to "fix" any mistakes his subordinates made. How does a leader differentiate between when it is appropriate to allow subordinates to make mistakes and when it is not?

Experiential Discussion:

DISCUSSION CONTENT

According to the Q&A session, CPT Young felt that his time was better spent dealing with the warlords than with his subordinates. He believed that the warlord's culture specified that he pay attention to them, and his focus on the mission began to shift toward one of maintaining positive relations with the Afghan population. After all, this is what CSM Pullman led Young to believe, and CPT Young's lack of mission clarity allowed CSM Pullman to divert CPT Young's attention. CPT Young felt that his subordinates should be able to handle the tasks they were given.

CPT Young's commander did not spend much time providing guidance, so CPT Young believed this was an appropriate leadership model to replicate.

CPT Young also believed that he was helping develop his subordinates by letting them figure things out for themselves. After all, this was the approach that his commander used. CPT Young believed that he was a good leader who was empowering the Soldiers under his command. Instead, his Soldiers were just confused, frustrated, and anxious.

CPT Young believed that, if his subordinates made mistakes, he would be able to repair those mistakes before it was too late. Given the time crunch that Young and his Soldiers were under, this was a serious miscalculation on his part.

Have you ever been in a situation in which you did not provide as much guidance to subordinates as they needed? Why? How did your subordinates react to you?

Have you ever been in a situation in which your leader did not provide you as much guidance as you needed? What did you do? What else could you do?

2. How did CPT Young's lack of guidance toward his subordinates contribute to the failure of the mission?

PROBES

How did lack of guidance impact 1LT Perez and 2LT Wychowski's planning?

What are some examples of poor leadership on the part of 1LT Perez?

Why do you think that 1LT Perez acted that way?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

Because the Soldiers did not have a clear understanding of the mission, they could not construct a feasible plan to obtain the mission's objectives. Additionally, Young's treatment of his subordinates discouraged them from asking for clarification or guidance even though it was critical to the success of the operation. Thus, Young's lack of guidance meant that his subordinates were "flying blind," not sure what tasks they needed to complete, and not coordinating efficiently or effectively with one another. Because of the short time frame of the food distribution operation, Young did not have time to go back and correct his subordinates' mistakes like he thought he would.

Also of concern is that 1LT Perez mimicked CPT Young's poor model of command. When 2LT Wychowski asked 1LT Perez for guidance, 1LT Perez told 2LT Wychowski to "Think outside the box.... Improvise." 1LT Perez did not believe he needed to provide 2LT Wychowski with guidance because Wychowski heard the same information that Perez did when CPT Young reviewed Perez's plans. 1LT Perez also took 1SG Jones with him to make contact with the NGO convoy in order to "free up Jones" because he thought this was something consistent with CPT Young's notion of leadership.

MISSION CLARITY

The Lesson: CPT Young did not have a good understanding of the mission. Over the course of the operation, his understanding of the mission changed from one of securing a site for a food distribution operation to one of maintaining positive relations with the locals (including the “warlords”). CPT Young’s Soldiers had even less of an understanding of the mission than CPT Young did, and they were confused by his actions.

Learning Objectives:

1. Understanding why CPT Young did not have a solid understanding of the situation and mission he was undertaking.
2. Understanding what factors led CPT Young to lose focus on his mission.
3. Recognizing what 1LT Perez thought his role in the mission was.
4. Understanding how 1LT Perez’s lack of understanding of the mission contributed to mission failure.
5. Recognizing that 2LT Wychowski did not have a clear understanding of the mission because CPT Young did not convey it.
6. Recognizing that 2LT Wychowski’s conception of his role in the mission was in error.
7. Recognizing that 1SG Jones’ understanding of the mission changed throughout the operation.

Potential Questions Begin on Next Page:

1. What was CPT Young's original understanding of the mission? Why was his early understanding unclear?

PROBES

What kind of briefing do you think that CPT Young received? How do you think that impacted his understanding of the mission?

What impact did CSM Pullman have on CPT Young's understanding of the mission?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

According to CPT Young's Q&A session, Young was only briefed in generalities. His commander did not provide specifics and promoted a climate of not asking questions. Consequently, CPT Young only had a general understanding that the mission was to provide security for a food distribution operation being handled by an NGO.

Furthermore, CPT Young allowed CSM Pullman to shape his understanding of the mission. CPT Young's original mission was to secure the site for the NGO trucks, but he got pulled into the notion of maintaining positive relations with the local population. CPT Young's shift toward "being partners with the locals" partially contributed to letting the warlords stay at the site.

2. Did CSM Pullman's presence cause CPT Young's concept of the mission to shift? Why or why not? Discuss the reasons why CPT Young allowed CSM Pullman to shape his understanding of the mission.

PROBES

What do you think that CPT Young thought his mission was?

How did CPT Young's concept of the mission change over time?

Why did his concept of the mission change over time?

Give some examples that demonstrate that CSM Pullman was influencing CPT Young's judgment.

Why do you think CPT Young listened to CSM Pullman?

Did Young view Pullman as an expert?

Do you think that CPT Young had any "political" concerns when dealing with CSM Pullman?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

CPT Young was never clear on the mission to begin with because, much like himself, his commander did not like to answer questions or take the time to provide guidance to his subordinates. Thus, CPT Young arrived at the site with nothing more than a general notion of what the mission and intent were. That is, CPT Young's original notion of the mission was that he was there to provide security for a food distribution operation for an NGO convoy.

CPT Young's fuzzy notion of the mission made him more susceptible to losing track of what the mission was. CSM Pullman's presence on site made CPT Young question the nature of the mission, and Young's notion of the mission began to shift. While Young maintained in his Q&A session that his primary mission was to set up a food distribution operation, his behavior conveyed that his concept of the mission began to encompass things like maintaining positive relations with the locals. For example, CPT Young spent more time dealing with Omar than ensuring that his Soldiers were properly preparing the site. From CSM Pullman's perspective, Omar was just another local that should be viewed as a potential partner. However, from the perspective of the security and setup of the food distribution operation, Omar was a definite threat.

Although CPT Young seems like an obstinate individual who does not listen to the advice of anyone, he did modify his behavior because of Pullman's presence. Case in point, CPT Young allowed the Afghans to retain their weapons, entertained a conversation with Omar (which is exactly what Omar wanted), allowed both Omar and Mohammed's men to stay in and around the site, and had one squad sent up to deal with the Afghans instead of two.

Whether CSM Pullman was aware of it or not, he had several sources of influence over CPT Young:

- CPT Young viewed Pullman as a resource, since the CSM had experience with similar sorts of operations and with the culture.
- Pullman sat in on the briefings, so Young believed that Pullman had a pretty good idea about what was going on. Additionally, Young believed that Pullman's relationship with the Brigade commander gave him knowledge about what the Brigade commander wanted.
- Pullman's existing relationship with the Brigade commander gave Pullman a sort of "political" power over Young. Young was concerned about the information that would get back to Brigade about him and his boss.

3. *1LT Perez was not very clear on his role in the mission. What do you think that 1LT Perez believed his role in the mission was?*

PROBES

If you were in 1LT Perez's shoes, what would you have thought the mission was?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

According to 1LT Perez in his Q&A session, he believed that his primary role in the mission was to make what CPT Young wanted to happen, happen. Consequently, 1LT Perez believed that one thing he was supposed to do was to keep the rival families apart. However, in an answer to another question, 1LT Perez also indicated that he was supposed to slow the NGO convoy down.

4. *How did 1LT Perez's lack of understanding of the mission contribute to mission failure?*

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

1LT Perez did not understand that securing the site took precedence over maintaining positive relations with the warlords. 1LT Perez's lack of understanding of the mission contributed to mission failure because, although he knew it was important to stop the trucks, he didn't place it as a high enough priority. Instead, he had 2LT Wychowski stringing up wire and 1SG Jones riding along with him in the Humvee. If 1LT Perez had understood that stopping the convoy (not just slowing them down, as CPT Young had said) was the key—not keeping rival families apart—Perez might have approached his task differently and provided different guidance to his subordinates.

5. *How did 2LT Wychowski's understanding of the mission change over time? Why did 2LT Wychowski's understanding of the mission change over time?*

PROBES

How did 2LT Wychowski's understanding of the mission change over time?

Why didn't 2LT Wychowski have a better understanding of the mission?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

According to 2LT Wychowski's Q&A session, Wychowski initially thought that the mission was to provide security for a food distribution operation. Then 2LT Wychowski thought they were involved in some sort of PSYOPs operation to improve relations with the locals. Then 2LT Wychowski thought the mission was to stay alive.

2LT Wychowski did not have a clear understanding of the mission throughout the operation because the original mission had never been made clear. CPT Young never clarified for any of the Soldiers what the mission was, and CSM Pullman brought a different mission with him. Because CPT Young never clarified what the mission was, 1LT Perez also never communicated the mission downward. Further, CPT Young's actions were confusing because they were somewhat more consistent with improving relations with the Afghans than with securing the site. Additionally, the command climate was such that 2LT Wychowski did not ask for clarification on what he should be doing. When 2LT Wychowski asked 1LT Perez about the fencing, Perez told Wychowski to "Invent. Improvise."

6. *What did 2LT Wychowski believe his role in this mission was?*

PROBES

Experiential Discussion:

DISCUSSION CONTENT

According to 2LT Wychowski's Q&A session, he believed that his mission was to handle the task given to him by the XO (1LT Perez). In this mission, he believed his role was to keep the rival families apart so that they didn't steal each other's food.

How would you have made sure that 2LT Wychowski understood his role in the mission?

If you were in 2LT Wychowski's shoes, what steps would you have taken to ensure that you understood your role in the mission?

7. How did ISG Jones' understanding of the mission change over time?

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

According to ISG Jones, he initially thought the mission was to provide security for a food distribution operation. Then ISG Jones became confused because the mission appeared to turn into a public relations operation due to CPT Young's actions and CSM Pullman's presence.

Experiential Discussion:

How would you have made sure that ISG Jones understood his role in the mission?

If you were in ISG Jones' shoes, what steps would you have taken to ensure that you understood your role in the mission?

MODEL OF COMMAND

The Lesson: CPT Young was not a good role model for effective leadership. He made several mistakes; including failure to communicate the mission, intent and plans; failure to provide guidance to subordinates; failure to utilize the expertise and knowledge of his more experienced Soldiers (e.g., 1SG Jones); and failure to convey that he could be approached by his Soldiers if they needed guidance or clarification.

Learning Objectives:

1. Recognizing that CPT Young's approach to developing his subordinates is ineffective.
2. Recognizing that the model of command comes from the top and has a downward influence.
3. Recognizing that 1LT Perez consciously passed down CPT Young's model of command.

Potential Questions Begin on Next Page:

1. What is CPT Young's approach to developing his subordinates? Is this approach effective? Why or why not?

PROBES

CPT Young believes that withholding guidance from his subordinates will help them develop leadership skills. Do you agree with this philosophy of development?

What do you think that a subordinate learns when you rebuke him or her?

As a leader, what are the advantages and disadvantages of allowing subordinates to make mistakes?

How important was it in this situation to provide goals or performance objectives to subordinates?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

CPT Young's Q&A session indicated that Young believed that the way he treated his subordinates contributes to their development as leaders and thinkers. CPT Young's approach to developing his subordinates is to provide them with minimal guidance so that they can figure things out for themselves. CPT Young will provide them with feedback when they do something incorrectly. When his subordinates ask for clarification or guidance, he will rebuke them so that they will learn to think for themselves.

CPT Young's approach is highly ineffective and even damaging to subordinate development. First, rebuking subordinates for asking clarification and guidance teaches subordinates that asking questions of their commander is a negative experience. Thus, the lesson subordinates learn is to avoid asking questions; it does not teach subordinates to think for themselves.

Second, waiting for subordinates to make mistakes hinders the performance of the subordinate and the unit. CPT Young is creating a system in which he will spend most of his time putting out fires and addressing poor performance rather than creating a system in which he proactively prevents poor performance by teaching his Soldiers how to perform well.

However, it should be noted that leaders must sometimes risk allowing subordinates to make mistakes. In providing developmental opportunities to subordinates, sometimes subordinates will succeed and sometimes they will fail. It is up to the leader to assess when the risk of failure is acceptable and how to constructively mold failures into a learning experience.

Third, CPT Young does not communicate what the appropriate performance standards are and what his expectation of good performance is; thus, his subordinates will have difficulty in differentiating between good and poor performance and have problems developing plans to achieve an ambiguous standard.

MORE ON NEXT PAGE

PROBES

How effective are leaders who provide feedback only when things go wrong?

What is the impact of providing feedback only when subordinate mistakes?

Experiential Discussion:

DISCUSSION CONTENT

Fourth, by providing feedback only when things go wrong, the CPT is primarily focusing on mistakes, thereby contributing to a negative unit climate. Subordinates will attempt to cover up mistakes rather than use mistakes as an opportunity for learning. Fifth, by not providing feedback on good performance, there is reduced incentive for individuals to strive toward exceptional performance. Sixth, this is a poor model of leadership for subordinates to mimic when they move into their leadership roles. 1LT Perez adopted CPT Young's model when dealing with 2LT Wychowski, and the results were disastrous.

What steps should you take to ensure that you are developing the Soldiers under you?

2. Where do you think that CPT Young learned this leadership style?

PROBES

Where do you think that CPT Young learned how to be a leader?

Whose leadership style did 1LT Perez adopt?

Experiential Discussion:

DISCUSSION CONTENT

If CPT Young is to be believed, the model of command actually began with Young's commander. CPT Young models the behavior of his commander, and 1LT Perez modeled CPT Young.

What is your leadership style? Where did it come from?

What are the strengths of your leadership style? What are the weaknesses? How can you address those weaknesses?

3. How did CPT Young's leadership style impact 1LT Perez's style of leadership?

PROBES

How did 1LT Perez treat 2LT Wychowski?

Why do you think that 1LT Perez took 1SG Jones with him in the Humvee to establish radio contact with the NGO convoy?

Experiential Discussion:

DISCUSSION CONTENT

Perez modeled CPT Young's leadership style. Perez did not believe he needed to clarify the nature of the mission to his men. For example, 1LT Perez said in his Q&A session that, "Wychowski was there when CPT Young reviewed my plans and added his input. I mean everybody was there. We all saw everything." 1LT Perez thinks that he does not need to clarify the mission because CPT Young didn't.

1LT Perez delegated tasks down to 2LT Wychowski with little guidance because that was what CPT Young did with him. Further, 1LT Perez said that he took 1SG Jones in the Humvee with him to "free Jones up," because this was what CPT Young was doing—freeing the time up of the higher ranking Soldiers.

What example are you setting for others? Do other members of your team imitate your behaviors or attitudes? Why or why not?

RESPECT FOR EXPERIENCE

The Lesson: CPT Young did not effectively utilize the experience and expertise of his Soldiers. Specifically, CPT Young should have obtained information from 1SG Jones about the strengths and weaknesses of 1LT Perez and 2LT Wychowski. Because CPT Young was new to this company and he only had a short-time frame to set up the site, 1SG Jones' input and insight would have been invaluable.

Learning Objectives:

1. Understanding that 1SG Jones was an important asset underutilized by CPT Young.
2. Understanding 1LT Perez's qualities.
3. Understanding 2LT Wychowski's qualities.
4. Understanding that CPT Young's failure to capitalize on 1SG Jones' knowledge contributed to mission failure.
5. Understanding that 2LT Wychowski could have gone to his platoon sergeant and 1SG Jones for input since CPT Young and 1LT Perez provided no guidance.

Potential Questions Begin on Next Page:

1. How could CPT Young have best used 1SG Jones as an asset in this mission?

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

According to 1SG Jones' Q&A session, CPT Young should have asked Jones questions about the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants—"who's the most gung-ho, who holds back, who's good on point." 1SG Jones had knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of both 1LT Perez and 2LT Wychowski and could have provided valuable information to CPT Young about the men.

Experiential Discussion:

How do you determine the strengths and weaknesses of your Soldiers?

How important is the relationship between a Captain and a First Sergeant?

[For Captains] What is your relationship with your First Sergeant? How does this impact your unit's performance?

[For other Soldiers] What is your relationship between the Captain and First Sergeant in your unit? How does this impact your unit's performance?

2. What do you think that 1SG Jones would say about the strengths and weaknesses of 1LT Perez?

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

According to the Q&A session, 1SG Jones believed that 1LT Perez was a good organizer, but weak on strategy. 1LT Perez needed a commander who sees the larger picture.

3. What would 1SG Jones say about the strengths and weaknesses of 2LT Wychowski?

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

According to 1SG Jones' Q&A session, 2LT Wychowski is motivated and puts forth a lot of effort, but does not feel comfortable with taking the initiative. 2LT Wychowski needs to be exposed to a situation a couple of times before he feels comfortable on his own.

4. How did CPT Young's lack of understanding about the strengths and weaknesses of 1LT Perez and 2LT Wychowski play a role in the outcome of the operation?

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

Because CPT Young did not recognize that 1LT Perez needed a better understanding of the mission and how it fit in with the bigger picture, and because Perez was weak on strategy, Young's lack of clarification and guidance to Perez was damaging. 1LT Perez had difficulty organizing (his strength) because he didn't have a clear sense of what the objectives and plan were in the mission.

CPT Young also did not understand that 2LT Wychowski would be highly uncomfortable with taking the initiative to come up with a plan for stringing wire. To 2LT Wychowski, he was in a new situation and wanted guidance. Because CPT Young's leadership style was to have a hands-off approach until his men did something wrong, 2LT Wychowski was essentially left to flounder. More direction would have enabled Wychowski to invest his effort (his strength) in a more productive manner.

1SG Jones could have provided information to CPT Young about the strengths and weaknesses of both 1LT Perez and 2LT Wychowski, but CPT Young did not ask him.



If you were responsible for the operation, how would the information about the strengths and weaknesses of 1LT Perez have changed the way that you would have handled things?

If you were responsible for the operation, how would the information about the strengths and weaknesses of 2LT Wychowski have changed the way that you would have handled things?

5. *Who could 2LT Wychowski have gone to for input about rigging the site given that his superiors were not receptive to answering his questions?*

PROBES

DISCUSSION CONTENT

2LT Wychowski indicated in his Q&A session that he wished he had gotten input from both his platoon sergeant and 1SG Jones. Not only could they have given him guidance in rigging the site, but they also could have given him advice on how far to take the initiative.

**Experiential
Discussion:**

Who would you have gone to if you were 2LT Wychowski? Why? How do you think that would have impacted events in the situation?

LEADERSHIP ASSESSMENT

The Lesson: After focusing on the various activities of CPT Young, it might be helpful to summarize his leadership style with respect to the values, skills, attributes, and characteristics identified in FM 22-100. The purpose of this is two-fold. First, this is an excellent opportunity to summarize several of the leadership points emphasized throughout the discussion. Second, this is a chance for Soldiers to think about leadership as it pertains to Army doctrine.

Note that less discussion content is provided for this topic—it may be the case that there are no absolute right or wrong answers for the questions in this module. Additionally, instructors may want to select only a few of the questions contained in this module in order to manage their lesson time effectively. These discussion questions also can be applied to discuss the leader attributes of any of the characters, not just CPT Young.

An alternative to discussion is to assign these discussion questions and to ask students to provide a written assessment of CPT Young's performance as a leader using the doctrine outlined in FM 22-100. After completing the assignment, students can then compare or present their assessment of CPT Young as a starting point for another discussion on leadership.

Learning Objectives:

1. Knowing Army leadership doctrine as outlined in FM 22-100.
2. Applying Army leadership doctrine to the assessment of demonstrated leader values.
3. Applying Army leadership doctrine to the assessment of demonstrated leader attributes.
4. Applying Army leadership doctrine to the assessment of demonstrated leader skills.
5. Applying Army leadership doctrine to the assessment of demonstrated leader actions.

Potential Questions Begin on Next Page:

1. What criteria should leaders be measured against?

PROBES

**Experiential
Discussion:**

DISCUSSION CONTENT

*Should the greatness of a leader be judged by **WHAT** he or she accomplishes or by **HOW** he or she accomplishes it?*

How do you determine if your leader is doing a good job or not?

How do you determine if you are an effective leader? Is this different from the standards you use to judge your leaders?

What criteria do you think that your subordinates are using to judge you? Is this different from the standards that you apply to yourself? How important is it that you understand how your subordinates perceive you?

2. Evaluate CPT Young with respect to how well he embodied the Army values outlined in FM 22-100. [Note: characters other than CPT Young also can be evaluated.]

PROBES

What are the Army values outlined in FM 22-100?

How did CPT Young perform with respect to each of those values?

Honor summarizes an individual's performance with respect to other values. Would you describe CPT Young as dishonorable? Is dishonor more likely to result from an individual's intention to do something dishonorable—or is dishonor more likely to result from an individual's lack of concern to place Army values foremost in his or her decision making?

Experiential Discussion:

DISCUSSION CONTENT

The Army Values outlined in FM 22-100 are:

Loyalty—Bear true faith and allegiance to the US Constitution, the Army, your unit, and to other Soldiers.

Duty—Fulfill your obligations.

Respect—Treat people as they should be treated.

Selfless Service—Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and subordinates before your own.

Honor—Live up to all the Army values.

Integrity—Do what's right—legally and morally.

Personal Courage—Face fear, danger, or adversity (physical or moral).

There is no one right answer to this question. CPT Young was not an especially "bad person," instead, his leadership style was not well-suited for this particular situation. However, some of CPT Young's behaviors might serve as indicators as to what he valued.

→ **Loyalty**—At the beginning of the film, CPT Young did state that he was responsible for the lives of 122 Soldiers. Such a statement might be an indicator of his concern for the welfare of the Soldiers under him.

→ **Duty**—Although CPT Young probably wanted to have a good outcome for the mission, he was unable to fully live up to his obligations because he had little understanding of the mission and intent. CPT Young needed to be more proactive in getting an accurate assessment of the situation and clarifying the nature of the mission.

→ **Respect**—CPT Young did not treat people as they should be treated—that is, with courtesy and respect. For example, publicly humiliating his XO in front of other Soldiers was unnecessary and communicated that the Captain did not value the dignity of his subordinates.

→ **Selfless service**—CPT Young may have been more concerned with how Brigade was going to perceive him and his commander rather than with the welfare of others. His "political" concerns allowed CSM Pullman's understanding of the mission to shift his understanding of the mission.

→ **Integrity**—CPT Young did not appear to be a dishonest person, and was probably honest. Any failings of his with respect to this value likely resulted from his failure to fully comprehend the situation from the outset.

→ **Personal Courage**—The true test would be dependent on how CPT Young acted after the villager was shot, and we do not have this information available to us. However, CPT Young seems to be the kind of person who will face challenges directly.

→ **Honor**—CPT Young's honor should be judged in relation to the other values.

Share an ethical dilemma that you have experienced. How did your values influence your thinking?

What behaviors can you engage in as a leader to demonstrate that you embody Army values?

3. Evaluate CPT Young with respect to how well he embodied the leader attributes outlined in FM 22-100.
[Note: characters other than CPT Young also can be evaluated.]

PROBES

What are the attributes listed in FM 22-100?

How would you evaluate CPT Young with respect to mental attributes?

How would you evaluate CPT Young with respect to physical attributes?

How would you evaluate CPT Young with respect to emotional attributes?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

Important leadership attributes can be divided into 3 categories: Mental, Physical, and Emotional.

- Mental attributes include will, self-discipline, initiative, judgment, self-confidence, intelligence, and cultural awareness.
- Physical attributes include health fitness, physical fitness, and military and professional bearing.
- Emotional attributes include self-control, balance, and stability.

Have you ever had a leader who lacked some of the important mental attributes outlined in FM 22-100? What impact did it have on you or your team?

How can you tell the difference between someone who is self-confident and someone who is arrogant and cocky?

As a leader, why is it important to demonstrate self-confidence?

Have you ever had to appear more self-confident or optimistic than you felt for the benefit of someone else? Why? What was the outcome?

Have you ever had a leader prone to emotional outbursts? How did this impact your perception of the leader? What kind of emotions should leaders display? What kind of emotions should leaders keep to themselves?

**Experiential
Discussion:**

4. Evaluate CPT Young with respect to how well he demonstrated the leader skills outlined in FM 22-100. [Note: characters other than CPT Young also can be evaluated.]

PROBES

What are the skills listed in FM 22-100?

How would you evaluate CPT Young with respect to his interpersonal skills?

How would you evaluate CPT Young with respect to his conceptual skills?

How would you evaluate CPT Young with respect to his technical skills?

How would you evaluate CPT Young with respect to his tactical skills?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

The important leader skills are divided into 4 categories: Interpersonal, Conceptual, Technical, and Tactical.

- Interpersonal skills—pertain to how the leader interacts with and relates to others. Examples of interpersonal skills from FM 22-100 include coaching, teaching, counseling, motivating, and empowering.
- Conceptual skills—pertain to mental skills such as reasoning, analyzing, and creative thinking.
- Technical skills—pertain more to skills specific to a job or specialty. Leaders must understand not only how to be good leaders, but how to perform the basic functions of their job.
- Tactical skills—pertain to solving tactical problems and likely involve a combination of interpersonal, conceptual, and technical skills.

In general, CPT Young did not appear to demonstrate many of the skills outlined in FM 22-100.

CPT Young's interpersonal style created a climate that discouraged subordinates from seeking clarification and advice. Indeed, CPT Young's interpersonal style discouraged his subordinates from communicating with him at all.

Conceptually, CPT Young did not appear to see the big picture of the mission and he did not have a good understanding of the situation that he was in. He failed to recognize Omar's ultimate agenda, and did not come up with a strategy for securing the site.

With respect to technical skills, it is difficult to say how technically proficient CPT Young is given the limited information we have on CPT Young. CPT Young might have been technically proficient, but even if he were, he was not proficient in communicating this information to his Soldiers.

Tactically, CPT Young was a disaster. To list a few examples: he did not communicate a plan for securing the site, he allowed the adversary to remain on the site, and he had no plan for stopping the NGO convoy in the event that the site was not secure.

**Experiential
Discussion:**

Describe a leader who had poor interpersonal skills. What did this leader do? How effective was this leader at influencing you? How was the climate of the unit affected? What was the impact on trust?

5. Evaluate CPT Young with respect to how well he demonstrated the leader actions outlined in FM 22-100.
[Note: characters other than CPT Young also can be evaluated.]

PROBES

What are the leader actions listed in FM 22-100?

How would you evaluate CPT Young with respect to his influencing actions?

How would you evaluate CPT Young with respect to his operating actions?

How would you evaluate CPT Young with respect to his improving actions?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

The important leader actions are divided into 3 categories: Influencing, Operating, and Improving.

- Influencing actions include communicating, decision making, and motivating.
- Operating actions include planning and preparing, executing, and assessing.
- Improving actions include developing, building, and learning (both self-development and improving the organization).

In general, CPT Young's actions were not very effective.

CPT Young was not influential. His interpersonal style discouraged communication with his subordinates. He did not fully assess the situation before making decisions and left some decisions to his subordinates without providing appropriate guidance. CPT Young was an ineffective motivator because he did not specify goals, nor did he clarify the mission and intent for his subordinates. Without clear goals, his subordinates were unable to come up with a feasible plan for securing the site.

CPT Young failed miserably with respect to operating actions: his planning and preparation were non-existent, and he did not have a plan to execute. Moreover, CPT Young never adequately assessed the situation, nor the capabilities of his men. 1SG Jones would have been an asset with respect to understanding the capabilities of the other Soldiers. However, in CPT Young's defense, he might not have had sufficient time to plan and execute the mission.

It may or may not be appropriate to engage in the full range of improving actions during a mission on such tight time constraints. However, CPT Young did a poor job of developing his subordinates. In this situation, his subordinates required a little more structure, guidance, and follow-up. Instead, CPT created a situation in which subordinates felt that they could not come to him with questions. Additionally, CPT Young was a poor role model of leadership, which might serve to undermine the leader development of subordinates. For example, 1LT Perez initiated CPT Young's tendency to rebuke subordinates who asked him questions.

Describe a leader whom you especially admired. What kind of leader actions did they demonstrate?

Put yourself in CPT Young's shoes. After examining all of the values, attributes, skills, and actions of effective Army leaders, what do you think that you would have done differently from CPT Young? Why?

**Experiential
Discussion:**

STOPPING THE NGO CONVOY

The Lesson: The US Army had incorrect information about the timing and direction of the NGO convoy. Additionally, the Army had difficulty establishing contact with the convoy due to the poor quality of the radios. In 1LT Perez's Q&A session, the lack of preparedness for the NGO convoy is somewhat explained, "We didn't know, until we were leaving base, which NGO was delivering food, what their route was, what the comm set-up was going to be." Regardless, stopping the NGO convoy until the site was secure was key to mission success.

Learning Objectives:

1. Understanding how CPT Young's assumptions about the NGO trucks contributed to mission failure.

Potential Questions Begin on Next Page:

1. Why were the NGO trucks allowed to enter the site before it was secure?

PROBES

What role did communications play?

Can you always count on communications with non-military groups to work?

What sort of information did the Army have on the timing and route of the NGO Convoy?

Why didn't Soldiers seem to realize that the trucks needed to be prevented from entering the site until it was secure?

What was CPT Young's role in the Soldiers' lack of understanding?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

Several factors contributed to the NGO trucks arriving at the site before it was secure.

- The NGO trucks and the Army did not have workable radios to permit speedy communication between them. Thus, the Army was not able to tell the trucks to stop before entering the site. A plan should have been developed prior to setup about how to stop or contact the NGO trucks in the event of an emergency, such as uninvited warlords.
- The Army had incorrect information about when the trucks would arrive. CPT Young thought the trucks would arrive much later, even though 1SG Jones said that the trucks were not very reliable. CPT Young took this to mean that the trucks would be late, not early.
- The Army had incorrect information about the road that the trucks would be coming from.
- CPT Young told 1LT Perez to "slow the trucks down." While CPT Young meant to stop the trucks, 1LT Perez thought Young literally meant to slow the trucks down. However, it is debatable that Perez would have been able to slow the trucks down at that point.
- None of the Soldiers had the sense that the NGO trucks were the top priority. Soldiers were pulled in too many different directions, pursued too many different goals without an idea of the big picture, and did not coordinate effectively with one another. All of this can be traced back to CPT Young's lack of communication about the nature of the mission and his interpersonal style, which discouraged subordinates from seeking clarification and guidance.

Experiential Discussion:

Can you always expect your information to be accurate? How should leaders deal with the possibility of inaccurate information?

Has anyone ever had the experience of receiving misinformation? How did it impact your team's performance? How did you adapt?

LEAVING THE SITE

The Lesson: 1LT Perez and 1SG Jones left the site to make contact with the NGO convoy. Given that the XO and the 1SG were critical to ensuring that the plan to secure the site was properly implemented, it was not a good idea to have these two valued individuals leave the site together. At least one of them needed to remain at the site to provide guidance and supervision.

Learning Objectives:

1. Understanding the factors that led 1SG Jones to go along with 1LT Perez's decision to leave the site to establish radio contact.

Potential Questions Begin on Next Page:

1. How do you think that ISG Jones felt about going off in the Humvee with 1LT Perez?

PROBES

Why do you think 1LT Perez asked ISG Jones to leave the site with him?

How do you think the presence of CSM Pullman on site made ISG Jones feel?

DISCUSSION CONTENT

According to ISG Jones' Q&A, Jones was surprised that 1LT Perez asked him to go in the Humvee. Jones speculates that Perez asked him because the XO didn't have a clear idea of what he should be doing. Thus, Perez took the ISG along for help and support. ISG Jones also was relieved to leave the site, because he thought that maybe CSM Pullman (in a sense, Jones' superior) might be checking him out.

How important was it to establish radio contact with the NGO convoy?

Given the circumstances and time constraints, what would have been a better idea for establishing radio contact with the NGO convoy?

If you were ISG Jones, would you have challenged 1LT Perez on his decision to leave the site? What would have been the result of your decision?

Experiential Discussion:

APPENDIX B
USING THE CASE STUDY METHOD

APPENDIX B

USING THE CASE STUDY AS AN INSTRUCTIONAL VEHICLE

This Appendix provides a general overview of the history and benefits of case studies in education. Additionally, the Socratic method is introduced as a discussion approach that instructors can use to help students benefit from the discussion. Individuals who merely wish to skim this section can find some of the more important points in text boxes throughout this Appendix.

Overview of the Case Study Method

Case studies come in a variety of forms and are used for a variety of instructional or exemplary purposes. Case studies often are presented on paper and can range from a few paragraphs to several hundred pages. Typically, a case study will describe a situation or series of events and students will be expected to discuss various elements in the case or to solve a problem embedded in the case. Case studies vary as to the amount of information provided, ranging from a few pertinent facts to a complex amalgam or irrelevant, contradictory, and significant facts. Additionally, the case study may be presented as a set of historical facts or told as a fictitious story.

Case studies have been used as an educational tool for a number of years, but gained popularity after Harvard's Business Administration Program adopted the case study method as a primary teaching technique in 1910 (Jennings, 1996). Today, the case study method continues to be used in business programs, but also is found in medical, teaching, and legal educational communities (e.g., Jennings, 1996; Stewart & Dougherty, 1993; Tarnvik, 2002; and Wright, 1999). Military educators also have utilized the case study method as a tool for enhancing the critical and analytical thinking skills of their students. For example, the *Defence of Duffer's Drift* by British Major General Ernest D. Swinton has been used as a case for discussion by several military educators. The Army's Advanced Strategic Art Program has incorporated historical case studies into its curriculum (Williamson, 2001), as has the Naval War College (Rempt, 2003).

The wide-spread use and type of case studies is not surprising given the many benefits associated with the case study method. First, case studies allow students an opportunity to apply knowledge from lectures, briefings, or books to realistic situations (Jennings, 1996; Wright, 1996). Second, case studies help students to think critically, analytically, and creatively in a wide variety of situations (Jennings, 1996). During a case study students learn how to discern what information is necessary to solve a problem (Stewart & Dougherty, 1993) and how to integrate diverse and discrepant pieces of information into a meaningful whole (Jennings, 1996). Additionally, case studies are used to illustrate how events are connected to one another and allow students to see interrelationships among situational elements (Wright, 1996). Because many case studies are left intentionally complex and ambiguous in order to mirror the uncertainty of the real world, students also learn how to deal with and tolerate ambiguity (Jennings, 1996; Lunsford, 1990). Third, the discussion process that typically follows a case study facilitates communication, interpersonal, and listening skills (Crittenden, Crittenden, & Hawes, 1999; Jennings, 1996). Furthermore, discussion provides students with an opportunity to give and receive constructive criticism, as well as to learn from it (Crittenden et al, 1999). Finally, case studies make students an active participant in the learning process, engaging students at both an intellectual and emotional level (Jennings, 1996).

Benefits of the case study method include:

- 1. Allowing students an opportunity to apply knowledge to a practical situation.***
- 2. Helping students learn to think critically, analytically, and creatively.***
- 3. Facilitating the development of interpersonal, listening, and communication skills.***
- 4. Making students an active participant in the learning process.***

Although case studies often are presented through paper vignettes, case studies can be presented through visual media, such as films. Presenting a scenario in a movie format is advantageous for several reasons, but the film medium is particularly suited to depicting elements of leadership that are less adequately conveyed through paper vignettes (Richardson, 1994). Specifically, film is an effective medium for conveying some of the “human” aspects of leadership, such as communication, interpersonal, and motivational skills. The film medium also permits complex depictions of events, conveys both auditory and visual information in real time, and communicates a sense of urgency and suspense to the audience. The *Power Hungry* film combines all of these elements and can serve as a case study to facilitate discussion on a variety of issues, ranging from tactical to interpersonal concerns. However, instructors should take advantage of the unique film format of *Power Hungry* to discuss the interpersonal and teamwork issues that are often excluded from typical paper format case studies.

Case studies portrayed through the film medium are useful for conveying some of the “human” aspects of leadership, such as communication, interpersonal, and motivational elements of leadership.

Instructors should take advantage of the Power Hungry film format to discuss the interpersonal and teamwork issues that are often excluded from typical paper format case studies.

Rippin, Booth, Bowie, and Jordan (2002) suggested that instructors use case studies in one of two ways. First, cases can be used to elicit problem-solving and decision-making so that students have the opportunity to apply information learned through lectures and briefings. This first approach is adopted

when the instructor wishes to illustrate or prescribe what individuals should do when confronted with a specific type of situation. Second, cases can be used to enhance critical and analytical thinking so that students are better prepared to deal with complex and uncertain situations. This second approach is adopted when it is anticipated that students will be confronted with complex and rapidly changing situations and environments. That is, this pedagogical approach is used to help individuals become more adaptive thinkers who can make sense of ambiguous environments. Consequently, instructors who use the *Power Hungry* scenario should adopt the second pedagogical approach, which emphasizes the development of thought processes that generalize across situations, rather than adopting the first pedagogical approach, which proposes that instructors prescribe solutions applicable only to situations similar to the film.

While case studies can be used to teach students to solve a problem in a specific situation, instructors can use the ambiguous and complex events of Power Hungry to emphasize the development of thought processes that can generalize across situations. If the latter pedagogical approach is adopted, the role of instructor is to facilitate discussion and debate rather than to provide answers and solutions.

In the second pedagogical approach, the role of the instructor is to facilitate discussion and debate rather than to provide answers and solutions (Rippin et al., 2002). The ideas and personal theories that are generated during the course of discussion are meant to be contested, challenged, and debated by other students (and possibly the instructor). In the case of the *Power Hungry* case study, the discussion process is used to help students develop an understanding of how the various components of leadership and teamwork are tied to how events unfold during the course of the mission. Additionally, the process of learning how to ask relevant and important questions, challenging ideas, and reflecting on one's assumptions about how leadership functions in the military are important outcomes of the discussion process. Ultimately, students should not only have developed answers to the questions posed by the instructor, but students should have developed a framework for thinking about and exploring problems encountered in leader and team activities.

The Socratic method of discussion is particularly suited to generating critical thinking and analysis of ideas in conjunction with a case study (Garner, 2000). The Socratic method is discussed in the next section.

Introduction to Socratic Dialogue

The Socratic dialogue process stems from the Greek philosopher Socrates and is described in the works of his protégé, Plato. Socrates valued questioning ideals and authority in the pursuit of truth. One of his basic assumptions was that knowledge could be self-generated; that is, one could acquire knowledge by probing deeply enough within one's self (Tweed & Lehman, 2002). Socrates demonstrated the technique of generating knowledge through artful questioning in Plato's dialogue, *Meno* (The reader is referred to Grube's 1981 translation of *Meno*, as well as a description of the Socratic method in Tweed and Lehman's 2002 article). In *Meno*, Socrates demonstrated how to help an uneducated slave learn geometry without telling the student anything about basic geometric principals. Using Socratic dialogue, Socrates asked a succession of questions to help the slave think through geometric issues and to generate logical conclusions. As a result of the dialogue process, the slave discovered geometric principles through his own logical reasoning and exploration of the topic.

The Socratic method makes the student an active participant in the learning process, and the questioning procedure helps the student to process information about a topic at a deep and expert level. The Socratic method can be contrasted with standard approaches to teaching, such as lecturing or PowerPoint presentations. For example, a geometry teacher typically would lecture about basic mathematical laws and principals and then expect students to memorize the information. This lecture method might be viewed as treating students as a passive receptacle for information because students are receiving and memorizing the information without fully thinking through the rationale for why such geometric principles exist. Thus, students might process the information at only a surface level because they have not fully thought through the rationale as to why such geometric theorems exist. When done correctly, however, the Socratic method compels students to fully examine a topic in great detail.

Socratic dialogue uses questions to generate knowledge. Through a line of questioning, students expose their implicit assumptions about leadership.

While instructors often use lectures as an appropriate method of instruction, the Socratic method is used today in instructional settings across a variety of topics. In the modern version of the Socratic method, the instructor uses a series of questions to aid students in pursuing a line of thinking. The instructor typically begins by asking a general question and then uses successive questions to help students identify the assumptions guiding their thinking and reasoning. Questions are used to point out logical inconsistencies in reasoning and to assist students in formulating a more logical framework for understanding phenomena. By isolating assumptions that guide problem analysis and solution development, students are better able to modify their assumptions and generate new conclusions or solutions. Additionally, the Socratic process can be used to assist students in reasoning into the future. Questions can be used to help students understand the implications of their proposed solutions or actions, and this can help students to formulate solutions that address not only short-term concerns, but satisfy long-term objectives.

Use of the Socratic method encourages deep-level processing of information and ideas and makes the student an active participant in his or her learning process. Socrates believed that deeply examining one's assumptions and beliefs was vital for understanding, and only through this questioning process could one find wisdom and truth (Tweed & Lehman, 2002). Socrates taught his students how to use the questioning process to question themselves so that they could generate knowledge without the benefit of an instructor. Thus, early in history, Socrates was providing his students with mental tools for self-development. Similarly, instructors today who use discussion and case studies help students to model how to think critically on their own (McDade, 1995). By building on ideas through the use of questions, students replicate the critical thinking process out loud and then learn to adopt that process when confronted with new and complex situations.

The Socratic method encourages deep-level processing of information and ideas and makes the student an active participant in his or her learning process.

The instructor can engage in Socratic dialogue to facilitate student understanding on a variety of teaching themes embedded in the *Power Hungry* scenario. The questions that appear in Appendix A are listed in a format that can help instructors in using Socratic dialogue. However, instructors must be well versed in the topic area and be able to deviate from the questions presented in order to challenge the student's thinking and logic.

APPENDIX C
POWER HUNGRY SCENARIO

POWER HUNGRY

INTRODUCTION¹

The dry heat of Afghanistan was unbearable. For miles, all that could be seen was the harsh terrain of dirt and rocks, broken by the occasional scruffy shrub that struggled to survive in unforgiving terrain.

In many ways, Afghanistan was a harsh environment—harsh on nature and harsh on humans. As part of a mission to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, many U.S. Soldiers have partnered with non-government organizations (also known as NGOs) such as the Red Cross in order to provide food and supplies to alleviate the suffering of a nation.

This is the story of one Army company's experience in Afghanistan...

THE STORY BEGINS

The food distribution site was set in a dusty valley, surrounded by high ridges that any enemy could use to their advantage. Soldiers worked diligently under the unrelenting sun to string concertina wire along the saddle of the ridge. Under a brilliant blue sky, Soldiers rapidly unloaded fencing material, tents, and other equipment, while still other Soldiers laid out paths using wooden stakes. Local Afghans hired as security by the US Government stood or sat around in small, tight groups. A goat bleated somewhere in the background. Meanwhile, Brigade headquarters had sent Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Pullman to document the entire food distribution operation. As the Soldiers worked quickly to secure the site, CSM Pullman directed a cameraman and a soundman to document the activities as they took place. The soundman's furry microphone seemed somewhat out of place.

It was hard to tell if Captain (CPT) Young took all of these things in as he bounced along the ridge in the passenger's seat of his Humvee. CPT Young was a fair-haired and handsome man, about 30. He reflected on how he found himself suddenly involved with the food distribution operation. The previous commander had been airlifted out of the operation with an appendix that was about to explode. CPT Young received the order to take command, and left details of the operation with his executing officer (XO), First Lieutenant Perez. It was after being flown in at the last minute and briefed by his superior that CPT Young now found himself making his way toward the site in a Humvee that mightily bucked and bounced up the ridge road. As the Humvee slowed to a stop, CPT Young jumped out and carelessly threw his notebook onto the hood of the vehicle.

CPT Young walked toward the command center, which was located on a relatively flat area near one of the ridges. Six armed Soldiers stood guard over two camouflage tents. The second tent was CPT Young's tent and contained a table and some chairs. A cautious-looking First Lieutenant (1LT) Perez in his late twenties stood near the tent and held a map. Next to 1LT Perez stood a powerfully built African-American in his late forties. He was a seasoned non-commissioned officer (NCO) named First Sergeant Jones.

CPT Young approached the First Lieutenant and First Sergeant and saluted. 1LT Perez and 1SG Jones returned the salute. CPT Young looked at 1LT Perez pointedly and asked, "How's it going, Lieutenant? What's your thinking here?"

¹ Power Hungry was originally written as a script by Jay Douglas and Kim LeMasters for the Institute for Creative Technologies (2002).

1LT. Perez, pointing to the map replied, "It's going very well, sir. Villagers enter along this road below us. Road Alpha One. They exit ninety degrees to the East."

CPT Young then asked, "And the NGO trucks come in...?"

Perez pointed to the left and said, "... Road Bravo Three. We'll stage them off the road, close to us. That'll leave a path for the villagers' departure."

CPT Young, continuing his questioning, asked, "Aren't the trucks due at 1500 hours?"

"Affirmative, sir," replied 1LT Perez.

CPT Young looked across the landscape at the filming crew. "Sergeant Major Pullman's crew?" he asked 1LT Perez.

1LT Perez replied, "Yes, sir. Brigade's been filming for about an hour."

"How many food distribution ops have you done, Perez?" CPT Young inquired.

"First time, sir," 1LT Perez replied matter of factly.

CPT Young, looking out over the food distribution site, stated, "Gentlemen, we are responsible for the lives of one-hundred-twenty-two United States Soldiers. We do this thing right! I've done two of these ops. Not a lot, but enough to know that this one could go south on us." CPT Young paused for dramatic effect before continuing. "The site stinks. Soft sand, a wide perimeter that's going to spring more leaks than the Titanic, and only half the time we need to turn it into the world's largest McDonald's."²

As CPT Young was speaking, CSM Pullman climbed up the rise and inserted himself into Young's space.

Perez guardedly asked CPT Young, "Did you have something specific in mind, sir?"

CPT Young turned briefly to CSM Pullman and said in a low voice, "Give me a moment, Sergeant Major." Turning to Perez and raising his voice, Young abruptly rebuked 1LT Perez, "First lesson I learned when I was an XO. Never ask your CO a question you can't answer."³

Perez quickly began to backpedal. "Yes, sir. I only meant that you seem to see something I'm missing, sir."

CPT Young, now speaking very loudly, returned, "Try thinking outside the box, lieutenant! Invent. Improvise. That's another lesson I learned as an XO."⁴

"Got it, sir," 1LT Perez said quickly, exchanging a look of bewilderment with 1SG Jones.

Turning to CSM Pullman, CPT Young asked, "Now, what's so all fire important, Sergeant Major?"

CSM Pullman was in his early 40s, trim, and spoke with a barely perceptible Southern accent. He pointed to the opposite ridge and stated, "That is, Captain."

CSM Pullman was pointing at ten Afghan men, armed with guns and knives, standing on the opposite ridge.

ENTER THE OMAR THE WARLORD

The ten armed Afghans surrounded another Afghan reclining in what—of all things—appeared to be a director's chair. In stark contrast to the other Afghans, he looked manicured and composed. His name was Omar, and he was a warlord. He sat overlooking the food distribution operation, tapping the tips of his fingers together.

² The selection of the site was more of a political decision than a tactical one. The site was selected because it was supposed to be in neutral territory and in a good location for villagers to get the food.

³ CPT Young inadvertently is establishing a climate in which his subordinates feel uncomfortable asking him questions and for guidance. The irony is that CPT Young believes that he is helping to develop 1LT Perez by encouraging Perez to figure things out for himself.

⁴ CPT Young just belittled his XO in public, conveying to all Soldiers present that he does not like to be bothered with questions.

A US Army interpreter named Sergeant Finn climbed the ridge to speak with Omar and began talking to him in Farsi.

As CPT Young and CSM Pullman climbed to the top of the ridge, SGT Finn approached them. The Afghans stared menacingly at the Soldiers.

CPT Young said to SGT Finn, "Give me a SITREP, Finn."

Finn replied seriously, "His name is Omar, and he lives about 20 clicks to the north. He says his clan considers the local village and all this land under his protection. He's here to help us with security." Finn underscored "us" with a faint trace of cynicism.

Young quickly and quietly turned to CSM Pullman. "Brigade arranged local security, didn't it?"

CSM Pullman answered, "Yes, sir."

CPT Young again turned toward SGT Finn, "Tell him we'll discuss this at the command center. I want to get him off this ridge."

As Finn went to relay the message to Omar, CPT Young pulled CSM Pullman aside. "What's the protocol for an uninvited warlord?"

"Sir, we need to clear him through Brigade," CSM Pullman replied.

"Do it," CPT Young stated.

CSM Pullman countered, "That's a minimum of two hours. And more like three."

CPT Young responded, "In two hours the food trucks will be here. I need some help, Sergeant Major. Call your boss. Pull some strings."

"It's not all the Brigade's doing, Captain. The formalities take time," Pullman asserted.

While CPT Young was throwing Pullman a look of disbelief, SGT Finn came up to Young. "It gets worse, sir. It seems Omar's bent out of shape. Big time. Wants to know why he wasn't asked for help in the first place. He's not in the mood to answer any questions. And he's definitely not moving off this spot."

CSM Pullman continued his conversation with CPT Young, "If I'm going to pull some strings, I need to know about his family, his area of control, where his loyalties are, does he speak English... but first, we have some tea."

CPT Young shot a skeptical look at CSM Pullman. "Sergeant Major, under the circumstances I find that a strange suggestion."

Undaunted, Pullman continued, "Then we talk about his relatives, where they live, their history... It's their culture, sir. We need to be sensitive."

CPT Young looked at the youthful interpreter, SGT Finn, as if about to give an order. SGT Finn's head was giving the slightest hint of a nod as if he was agreeing with CSM Pullman's statements. Young said to Finn, "Do whatever you have to. And get them to lose those weapons."

CSM Pullman interjected, "Sir, guns among Afghans... you've got to remove them surgically."

CPT Young retorted, "Fine. We'll bring up a squad." Pullman shook his head.

CPT Young, turning to face CSM Pullman fully, stated, "Is there a reason you're not on board here, Sergeant Major?"

Pullman looked intently at CPT Young and said, "All I'm saying is so far nothing's happened. We don't want to escalate." Pullman paused and then asked quietly, "Do we?"⁵

⁵ Part of CSM Pullman's mission is to ensure that the Americans have positive relations with the locals, while CPT Young's mission is to secure the site. In CSM Pullman's eyes, Omar should be viewed as part of the locals, and CPT Young should treat him courteously. CSM Pullman is trying to influence the manner in which CPT Young deals with Omar and his men. CSM Pullman does influence CPT Young—CPT Young allows Omar and his men to retain their weapons.

ROAD ALPHA ONE

Calling Road Alpha One a road was a bit of a euphemism. It was mostly dirt paved with dust, but it was a road in that it did lead somewhere. Road Alpha One connected the village to the food distribution site, and today dozens, if not hundreds, of hungry Afghan locals trekked toward the promise of food and water.

Soldiers were busily working around Road Alpha One, laying out meter-wide paths of concertina wire and probing the rocky ground for places to lay stakes.

1LT Perez was also busy on Road Alpha One. At the moment, he was studying a map with 1SG Jones and his subordinate Second Lieutenant Wychowski.

1LT Perez pointed to a spot on the map and said, "We'll put up some quick fencing here. It'll keep rival clans a couple of meters apart."

Lt Wychowski observed, "That's a lot of wire to pull. And in this heat. Right, Top?" Top was the officers' nickname for 1SG Jones.

1SG Jones responded with enthusiasm, "Right. There's definitely work to do here."

A crackle of static on 1LT Perez's walkie-talkie momentarily interrupted the discussion. In between bouts of static, 1LT Perez could hear CPT Young saying, "Perez, is it your intention to string wire up that ridge?"

1LT Perez hit the walkie-talkie button on his collar and tilted his chin down toward his camouflage lapel. Perez replied, "Pretty much, sir. Force everyone down Road Alpha One."

Young's voice came back over the walkie-talkie, "You're still overreaching. You can't pull that off, either. I want you to re-rig those paths, make them shorter. When are the trucks due?"

While CPT Young was speaking, CSM Pullman said to CPT Young, "Captain I need you. Now, sir."

CPT Young continued over the walkie-talkie to 1LT Perez, "Get me an exact ETA on the trucks. Report back later."

Perez turned to 1SG Jones and LT Wychowski, "We'll have to make radio contact with the NGO trucks."

LT Wychowski disagreed, "Sir, I heard him say he wants us to rethink the fencing."

1SG Jones responded to 1LT Perez's concern, "They're using old-style HF radios. It may take a bit of hunting for some good reception."⁶

1LT Perez looked at Wychowski and said firmly, "We're in a box here, Wychowski. Invent. Improvise."⁷ Ignoring Wychowski's puzzled look, 1LT Perez turned to Jones and said, "Top, you're with me."

As 1LT Perez and 1SG Jones walked away, LT Wychowski looked around uncertainly.

MOHAMMED THE WARLORD

On the ridge where Omar was once sitting calmly in his director's chair, chaos and confusion now ensued. While CPT Young was speaking with 1LT Perez, another warlord and his tribe had arrived on the scene. Unlike Omar, Mohammed the warlord was tall and skinny, and currently he had a very hostile expression on his face. The two tribes taunted each other loudly in Farsi, shaking their weapons angrily at one another.

Mohammed gestured wildly and yelled at SGT Finn in Farsi. SGT Finn came running over to CPT Young and CSM Pullman.

⁶ Communication was not established prior to the mission because the Soldiers found out which NGO was delivering the food only after arriving at the site. The NGO does not have the same level of technology as the US Army, which presents challenges in communication.

⁷ 1LT Perez is mimicking CPT Young's manner of dealing with subordinate questions, thereby perpetuating CPT Young's command climate.

CPT Young nodded at Finn and said, "Finn?"

SGT Finn informed CPT Young that Mohammed was in charge of a clan that lived west of the village.

CPT Young turned to his driver and said, "Tell Wychowski to send up a pair of squads."

CSM Pullman quickly interjected, "Begging your pardon, sir, but you can't get caught in the middle of a confrontation. The CO likes good relations with the locals. Wants us to be their partners."

CPT Young retorted, "Do those guys look like they want to be our partners?"

CSM Pullman responded, "You're the OIC. But I do know my boss wants this win in a bad way."⁸

"I understand, Sergeant Major." For a brief moment, a shadow of uncertainty played over CPT Young's face. Then CPT Young turned to his driver. "Have Wychowski send up a single squad."⁹

The clamor of the two tribes swelled even louder. SGT Finn cut into the discussion, "Our second visitor says he is also here to render security."

CPT Young retorted loudly to be heard over the rising noise of the rival tribes, "Does he know we're the Army? Rendering security is what we do!"

"He wants the same deal you gave Omar," SGT Finn stated.

CPT Young looked at SGT Finn. Speaking loudly so that his voice would be heard over the clamoring tribes, Young said, "Well, tell him there is no deal." Then speaking to his driver, CPT Young ordered, "That squad. I want it now."

By this point, Omar and Mohammed had begun shouting at each other in Farsi, pointing and waving their arms aggressively. Disdain for Mohammed contorted Omar's face. At the sign of the escalating conflict, several US Soldiers came running up the ridge, inserting their bodies between the rival tribes. CPT Young yelled at the Soldiers, "Keep these two groups apart."

CPT Young and CSM Pullman, now in the thick of things, used their bodies to create a physical barrier between Omar and Mohammed. CPT Young pointed at Mohammed and yelled, "You. Over there...." Young pointed to a spot about 10 meters away from where he was standing.

CPT Young then shouted at Omar, "And you. Get your men under control or I'll arrest your whole outfit."

Omar began yelling at SGT Finn in Farsi. SGT Finn, his body bouncing off the agitated Afghans, made his way toward CPT Young. Finn stated, "Omar wants a word with you. In private."

Young looked as if he was thinking for a second. "Let's separate these guys for good. Tell Omar we talk at the command center."

SGT Finn relayed CPT Young's message in Farsi, and Omar glared piercingly into CPT Young's eyes. Something unspoken passed between Omar and CPT Young. Suddenly, Omar yelled loudly to his men in Farsi, and they began to fall back. Omar began to walk off with CPT Young. Omar flicked his hand in the air, and his men began to follow him down the ridge.

Mohamed also yelled to his men, and his men began to pull back. Mohamed began to walk off, but not before shooting a brief look of disgust toward the American Soldiers.

IN THE AFGHAN FOOTHILLS

While the tension between the two tribes was beginning to escalate into a likely eruption of violence, 1LT Perez and 1SG Jones were driving through the foothills in a Humvee. The diesel engine rumbled loudly as Jones attempted to make radio contact with the NGO convoy. It was obvious that Jones was not working with state-of-the-art equipment.

⁸ CSM Pullman is attempting to influence CPT Young.

⁹ CPT Young allows CSM Pullman to influence how many squads he has sent up.

Sweat poured down his face and stuck to his back, as he turned the dials of a 1980s-style high frequency radio transceiver sitting on the front seat. The only sound coming across the big green box of a radio was the sound of static.

1SG Jones stopped the Humvee he was driving. Jones held the transceiver's microphone and depressed the push-to-talk button on the side. "Food Caravan Five, this is Site One. Over."

Only static returned.

From the passenger's seat 1LT Perez told Jones, "Start moving slowly. A hundred meters at a time."

AT THE COMMAND CENTER

Six of Omar's men, armed with assault rifles and other weapons, stood shoulder to shoulder outside CPT Young's tent. Six US Soldiers anxiously faced them, nervous, but prepared for any sign of foul play. CPT Young and Omar sat across the table from each other in the tent. Sgt Finn and CSM Pullman stood nearby.

CPT Young looked at SGT Finn and ordered, "First of all, tell Omar..."

Omar interrupted, "Why don't we just speak English? I would think all this translation is tedious."

SGT Finn's head snapped sharply toward Omar. CPT Young looked at SGT Finn through narrowed eyes, and CSM Pullman looked as if he expected as much.

Omar continued, nonplussed. "I know Mohammed. I know him very well. He is a thief and a liar. He claims this land is his. In my country, food means power. So first he will steal the food, then use that power to steal the land."

CPT Young looked at Omar directly. With a touch of sarcasm in his voice, CPT Young asked Omar, "And if I speak to Mohammed, what would he say about you?"

The slightest hint of a smile danced around Omar's mouth. Omar calmly replied, "Many words, but no actions." He paused, and then emphasized, "I have radios. A hundred of my men are on their way. And another hundred after that. I can *protect* you against Mohammed."

PEREZ AND JONES IN THE FOOTHILLS

1LT Perez and 1SG Jones were stopped somewhere in the distant foothills. Jones continued to fiddle with the transceiver, attempting to establish contact with the NGO convoy. 1LT Perez stood outside the Humvee, leaning over the passenger's side door and watching Jones work.

1SG Jones bent down into the microphone. "Say your location AGAIN. OVER." He emphasized "again" and "over," as if that would somehow cause the radio to function better.

A heavily accented voice crackled back over white noise and static. It was virtually impossible to understand what the voice was saying.

1SG Jones looked at 1LT Perez and said, "Sir, from what I'm hearing, they're passing through the village north of here."

Perez looked at Jones in disbelief. "No. It can't be. That's not right. They're supposed to be coming from the west."

"Sir, they're talking about having passed the mosque and the village square. That's Road Alpha One," Jones insisted.¹⁰

¹⁰ The NGO convoy was supposed to arrive down Road Bravo Three.

1LT Perez, walking away from the Humvee, moved to a place where he had a better view of Road Alpha One. He put his binoculars to his eyes and peered through the glass. In the distance, he could see a cloud of dust begin to rise. The trucks were coming.

While Perez and Jones were discussing which road the trucks were actually coming down, CPT Young was speaking to Omar at the command center. "... This is neutral territory. And as the commander in charge of this operation, I wish to keep it that way. I insist you call your men off." It sounded more like a threat than a request.

Suddenly, CPT Young heard, "Sir? Sir..." coming from the walkie-talkie on the lapel of his camouflage shirt.

Immediately, 1LT Perez got on the walkie-talkie to CPT Young. "Sir? Sir, we're in deep. The NGO trucks are coming down Road Alpha One. Right along with the villagers. I estimate their ETA at five minutes!"

CSM Pullman stared at CPT Young intently. Pullman nodded almost invisibly to Young and quietly slipped away. Omar was watching CPT Young with keen interest.

Across the walkie-talkie, CPT Young's voice was insistent, "Slow them down. We're not ready, yet. I've got a hundred armed warlord troops on the way."

1LT Perez, seeing the rising dust cloud get larger and larger, replied, "I'll try and get it across, sir, but communication's not very good." He looked out over the road.

THE FOOD TRUCKS' ARRIVAL

The food trucks were moving down Road Alpha One at a steady pace. Along the ridge, Omar and Mohammed's men were being relatively quiet, now separated only by concertina wire.

Mohammed's men surrounded the warlord as he listened intently to his walkie-talkie. He lifted his gaze and his binoculars toward Road Alpha One, the villagers' road toward the food distribution site.

The lead truck, a large flatbed, was rounding the curve, followed by several other trucks varying in size and shape. The lead driver looked straight ahead, trying to control his nervousness. Villagers were already beginning to run up to the truck, hoping for the first units of food. More and more villagers appeared, seemingly out of nowhere. A few managed to jump aboard one of the smaller pickup trucks.

The lead driver, a large middle-eastern man, used his arm to swat villagers away through his open window. He slowed down, but did not stop the truck. He thought, *Wasn't this site supposed to be secure?*

Back at the command center, CPT Young stood outside the tent. He scanned to the right with his binoculars. He could see the clouds of dust along Road Alpha One and knew what 1LT Perez had said was true. He could hear the sounds of the villagers. CSM Pullman and SGT Finn joined CPT Young to see what the commotion was.

Speaking into his radio, CPT Young ordered, "All platoon leaders. Listen up. Deploy north along Road Alpha One. The NGO trucks are approaching from that direction. Stop those trucks."

The sound of yelling diverted Young's attention to the ridge with Mohamed and his men. Omar's men also were on the ridge. Concertina wire was the only thing separating the two tribes.

Mohammed was waving his hand-held walkie-talkie and binoculars in the air. He called out loudly in Farsi to the villagers in the food distribution area below.

CPT Young whipped his head toward SGT Finn. "What's he saying?" Young asked urgently.

SGT Finn looked at CPT Young with a puzzled expression, "He's telling them the food trucks are coming. And that Omar is feeding them."

CPT Young asked, "Omar???"

Finn continued, "He says this is Omar's land."

CPT Young rushed back into the tent where Omar was sitting, lounging like royalty with legs crossed. CSM Pullman and SGT Finn followed Young into the tent.

CPT Young shouted at Omar, "What is he doing?"

Omar looked at CPT Young with a smug smile and replied, "What any man would do for his brother-in-law."

CPT Young looked at Omar with a shocked expression on his face.

Outside the tent, the food distribution site began to erupt into chaos. Omar's men (which now, apparently, included Mohamed's men), rushed down the ridge toward Road Alpha One. Hundreds of villagers began flooding into the food distribution site, each villager wanting to make sure that he or she received food. The Soldiers who were redeploying up the road were caught off guard by the sudden movement of so many locals swarming the area. Bodies were jolted back and forth against one another as the crowd rapidly evolved into a mob. The deafening roar of the crowd drowned out the rumble of the approaching trucks. The trucks continued to drive as hungry locals flung themselves at the vehicles.

Inside CPT Young's tent, the radio phone began to ring. CPT Young picked it up.

LT Wychowski was huddled in the driver's side of his topless jeep, which was located in the midst of the chaos of the distribution site. All around him locals were running toward the food. Wychowski yelled into his radio phone to CPT Young, "SIR, I NEED HELP HERE. I'VE GOT LOCALS RUNNING RIGHT OVER THE FENCE. WE CAN'T HOLD THEM BACK, SIR. OVER."

Young replied over the radio, "Get some help from local security."

"Local security's gone, sir.¹¹ They've joined a group coming in from town. We're naked here," Wychowski shouted over the phone.

"Where's Perez," Young asked.

"Getting the ETA, like you asked," Wychowski answered, his voice cracking with tension.

Young said, "No. I mean where is he?"

Wychowski, struggling to be heard over the villagers, loudly replied, "Not around here, sir."

CPT Young slammed the radio phone back into its cradle.

Reaching for the walkie-talkie on his lapel, CPT Young shouted, "Perez. Where are you?"

"On our way back, sir," 1LT Perez answered.

"Back? From where?" Young yelled. Afghans were now running through CPT Young's tent in an effort to get to the trucks. The noise was deafening.

1LT Perez replied, "We were about two clicks up into the foothills. It was the only place we could make contact with the food trucks."

CPT Young grabbed his helmet off the table and rushed outside the tent. CSM Pullman and SGT Finn followed. The three of them surveyed the disaster unfolding before them. Hundreds of villagers were running through the food distribution site, and all of them were racing at breakneck speed toward the NGO trucks.

CPT Young yelled into his walkie-talkie, "I say again. All weapons locked and loaded." He struggled to be heard above the growing mob.

Dozens of Army Soldiers were attempting to control the crowd, but the villagers were too many. Villagers bumped into the Soldiers and then went around them, and the Soldiers were unable to prevent the unrelenting rush toward the trucks. Buckets and bodies crashed into the Soldiers, and the Soldiers were at a loss, afraid to use any force for fear of injuring or killing civilians.

¹¹ The head of local security and Omar fight jihad together against infidels. The US Army was unaware of this relationship.

CPT Young and the other US Soldiers went running down the hillside, toward the confusion. He strapped on his helmet as he ran into the heart of the mob.

Unguarded, Omar coolly left the tent to get a better view of the developing situation. One of his men opened his director's chair, and Omar sat down, crossing his legs. His eyes held a mixture of triumph and anticipation as he appraised the scene below him.

Villagers were mobbing the trucks. One villager threw himself underneath the lead truck, grabbing the front axle. The truck dragged him for several feet through the dust before coming to a complete stop. As soon as the truck stopped, hundreds of Afghans descended on the trucks. Two villagers reached into the driver's side window and pulled the driver onto the ground. Afghan warriors began to beat the villagers off of the trucks with their guns. Even over the roar of the crowd, the thuds of beatings could be heard.

Despite the confusion, one villager managed to climb to the top of the lead flatbed truck. He stood on top of the huge pile of food, and then reached down to grab a sack of food. He began to toss the sacks into the crowd. Villagers reached up to grab the heavy bags as they came hurling down. On the back side of the truck, Mohammed began to climb to the top.

Somewhere in the crush of people, LT Wychowski was being pushed and shoved by the relentless flood of villagers. He could barely hear himself yelling, "Stand down!" It was unclear whom he was trying to get this message across to.

CPT Young made his way to Wychowski and told him to retreat. Wychowski replied, "Yes, sir," and quickly left the scene. CPT Young continued to make his way through the crowd, telling his Soldiers to "get back to the deuce-and-a-half."

Mohammed was now at the top of the lead food truck. He pulled out a small, but lethal-looking sidearm. For one moment, Mohammed stood on top of the food truck like a great victor. Then, he pointed his gun at a villager climbing up the side of the truck. The gaze of the villager and Mohammed locked, as CPT Young watched from the distance. And then, with no compunction, Mohammed pulled the trigger. The villager fell back lifeless into the crowd. Mohammed watched, a trace of grim satisfaction on his face.

The gunshot cut through the air and rose above the clamor of the villagers, yet it did not deter them from crawling all over the truck. CPT Young saw the villager fall back into the crowd. Horror and disbelief spread over his face. Sweat ran down his body, and he unsnapped the strap of his helmet and wiped his brow. Everything now sounded far away to him, and in the distance he could hear his Soldiers calling to him.

"Captain? Where do you want me?"

"Do we have permission to engage, sir?"

"I have a guy..."

"I repeat. Where do you want me, Captain? Captain...?"

APPENDIX D
INFORMATION REVEALED
DURING THE COMPUTER INTERACTIVE SECTION

APPENDIX D

INFORMATION REVEALED

DURING THE COMPUTER INTERACTIVE PORTION

During the computer interactive portion of TLAC-XL, students have the opportunity to learn more about the characters and situation than what was presented in the film. Specifically, during the computer interactive session, students can engage in a question and answer (Q&A) session with various characters in the film. This information helps students to formulate a better understanding of why events unfolded as they did in the film. If an instructor is only using the film portion of TLAC-XL, the instructor can still use the information available in the computer interactive portion by "leaking" the information and facts during the course of discussion. The instructor also can use this information to answer any questions that students might have about different parts of the film. Information available in the computer interactive portion of TLAC-XL is presented below.

CPT Young's Leadership Style



- ➔ CPT Young adopted the leadership style of his commander. Like CPT Young, his commander conveyed that he was too busy to answer the questions of his subordinates. Additionally, CPT Young's commander only briefed Young in generalities, and discouraged Young from asking questions to obtain clarification about the mission.

- ➔ CPT Young stated that he did not provide guidance to his subordinates for several reasons. First, he believed that he was developing them by forcing them to think for themselves. Second, he believed that he was empowering his subordinates by giving them permission to make their own decisions and come up with their own plans. Third, CPT Young believed that his time was better spent dealing with the warlords than with providing guidance to his subordinates.

CSM Pullman

- CSM Pullman's mission was to "keep the locals happy." In CSM Pullman's eyes, Omar was a local and thus, one of his goals was to keep Omar pacified. It should be noted that keeping Omar pacified should not necessarily have been a goal of CPT Young's, unless pacifying Omar helped contribute to Young's objective of securing the food distribution site.



- CSM Pullman was selective in the advice that he offered CPT Young. Specifically, CSM Pullman appeared more willing to offer advice when it contributed to maintaining his objective (ensuring positive relations with the locals) than when it contributed to CPT Young's objectives (securing the site). One question that students might have is, "Why wasn't CSM Pullman more proactive in providing CPT Young with advice?" CSM Pullman suggests in his Q&A session that CPT Young should ask for advice if he needs it and that it would be inappropriate to continually interject his advice.

1LT Perez



- 1LT Perez did not have a clear understanding of the mission. According to Perez in his Q&A session, he believed that his primary role in the mission was to make what CPT Young wanted to happen, happen. However, it is clear through 1LT Perez's actions that he did not know what CPT Young wanted to happen. At one point in the Q&A session, 1LT Perez believed that he was supposed to contribute to keeping the rival families apart. In another portion of the Q&A session, 1LT Perez indicated that he was supposed to **slow down** the food trucks. However, CPT Young indicated in his Q&A session, that he wanted 1LT Perez to **stop** the trucks, not slow down the trucks.
- According to 1SG Jones, 1LT Perez was a good organizer, but weak on strategy. 1LT Perez needed a commander who could see the bigger picture.

1SG Jones

- ➔ 1SG Jones was a valuable asset that CPT Young underutilized. 1SG Jones had information about 1LT Perez's and 2LT Wychowski's performance strengths and weaknesses. Given the time constraints that CPT Young was under, 1SG Jones could have been an invaluable resource to Young in ensuring that Perez and Wychowski were implementing a plan for successfully securing the food distribution site.
- ➔ 1SG Jones became confused about the nature of the mission as the situation unfolded. Initially, Jones believed the operation was to provide security for a food distribution operation, but then he became confused because the operation appeared to evolve into a public relations operation.



1LT Perez and 1SG Jones Leaving the Site



- ➔ 1LT Perez did not tell CPT Young that he left the site to contact the NGO convoy because CPT Young gave people the impression that Young did not want to be bothered with the details of his subordinates. Further, 1LT Perez did not want to distract CPT Young from dealing with the warlords, because he felt that dealing with the warlords was more important than the details of securing the site. 1LT Perez stated that he took 1SG Jones with him in the Humvee in order to "free Jones up" from his responsibilities and that this action was consistent with CPT Young's model of command. 1SG Jones' believes, however, that 1LT Perez took him to make radio contact because 1LT Perez did not know what he was supposed to be doing and wanted the assistance of 1SG Jones. 1SG Jones gladly went with 1LT Perez because he was a little nervous that CSM Pullman was evaluating him.

2LT Wychowski

- ➔ 2LT Wychowski did not have a clear understanding of the mission. In his Q&A session, 2LT Wychowski explains how his understanding of the mission changed as events unfolded. First, 2LT Wychowski believed that the mission was to provide security for a food distribution operation. Later, he thought that they were in a PSYOPs operation to improve relations with the locals. In the end, he thought the mission was to stay alive.
- ➔ 2LT Wychowski also states that he believes his role in the mission is: to handle the task given to him by the XO, 1LT Perez. 2LT Wychowski believed that his primary role was to keep the rival families apart so that they didn't steal each other's food.



- ➔ According to 1SG Jones, 2LT Wychowski is motivated and puts forth a lot of effort, but does not feel comfortable taking the initiative, especially in new situations. Wychowski needs to be exposed to a situation a few times before he feels comfortable on his own.
- ➔ 2LT Wychowski admits that he knew that his plan for establishing the site was not a good plan. Thus, one must wonder why Wychowski persisted in execute his plan if he knew that it would fail. 2LT Wychowski noticed that 1LT Perez had adopted CPT Young's command style, and went ahead with his plan because he knew he would not receive any guidance from 1LT Perez or CPT Young and knew they would not answer his questions. Additionally, 2LT Wychowski does not feel comfortable taking the initiative in new or uncertain situations. The combination of the command climate and Wychowski's personality contributed to Wychowski commitment to a poor plan of action. 2LT Wychowski indicated in his Q&A session that he wished he had gotten input from both his platoon sergeant and 1SG Jones. They could have provided Wychowski with some guidance for rigging the site and also could have given him advice on how far he should take the initiative.

Omar the Warlord




- Omar admits two reasons for wanting to seize control of the food distribution operation. First, Omar wanted the food as a source of power over the villagers. Second, Omar did not want Americans to be the ones to distribute the food.

- Omar knew quite a bit about how the US Army would react to him. First, he knew that CPT Young would want to deal with a tribal leader. Second, Omar created a persona that allowed CPT Young to underestimate Omar's true intention of taking over the food distribution operation. Omar passed himself off as a local who just wanted a cut of the food distribution operation—Omar stated that he was there to offer "protection" from Mohammed. CPT Young admitted later in his Question and Answer session that he thought that Omar "was just looking for a bigger piece of the pie." Third, Omar knew that if he staged a fight between himself and Mohammed, the Army would immediately jump to the conclusion that Omar and Mohammed were enemies.
- The computer interactive portion reinforces the importance of relationships as essential in how Omar executed his plan to seize the food convoy. Omar knew the correct timing and route of the NGO trucks because he had "kin of kin" in the village that the convoy originated from. Additionally, Omar fought jihad with the head of local security, and Omar had prearranged for local security to disappear when the food trucks arrived.
- If CPT Young had had a better understanding of Afghan culture, he might have been able to unearth the nature of the relationship between Omar and Mohammed. Omar indicated in his Q&A session that CPT Young should have asked Omar to introduce him to the village elders. Omar would have been unable to comply because the elders might have exposed Omar and Mohammed's relationship, thus eliminating Omar's advantage of surprise. Omar's failure to comply with CPT Young's request would have made CPT Young suspicious, and neither Omar nor Mohammed might have been allowed to remain at the site.

Site Selection

- Students might wonder why the US Army picked a site that would be difficult to secure and defend for the food distribution operation. In his Q&A session, CSM Pullman reveals that the decision was more of a political decision than a tactical one. The site was chosen because it was supposed to be on neutral land in which no warlords had or wanted control.



Lack of Communication with the NGO Convoy



- The US Army had incorrect information about the timing and direction of the NGO convoy and students often wonder why this was the case. In 1LT Perez's question and answer session, the lack of preparedness for the NGO convoy is somewhat explained, "We didn't know, until we were leaving base, which NGO was delivering food, what their route was, what the comm set-up was going to be." Additionally, the Army had difficulty establishing contact with the convoy due to the poor quality of the HF radios.

Aborting the Mission

- CPT Young briefly considered calling the operation off, but reconsidered when he recalled that CSM Pullman said that his boss wanted a win. CPT Young did not want jeopardize his reputation and the reputation of his commander by going against the Brigade commander's wishes.

